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PRIVATE RIGHTS OF ACTION UNDER
THE COMMODITY EXCHANGE ACTTHE SUPREME COURT DECIDES
DONNA C. LEEKER* & JAMES J. MOYLAN**
INTRODUCTION

In Merrill Lynch, Pierce, Fenner & Smith, Inc. v. Curran,'
the Supreme Court held that a private right of action exists
under the Commodity Exchange Act (CEA). 2 This decision is
significant because it indicates that the Court may have abandoned its painstakingly developed test for implying private
rights of action set forth in Cort v. Ash, 3 and has reversed the
recent trend in denying private remedies under sister legisla4
tion, the federal securities laws.
The purpose of this article is to analyze Curran by examining the arguments relevant to the implication of a private right
* J.D., UT Chicago-Kent College of Law 1982; B.A., Northern Illinois
University 1973; member Illinois State Bar; Associate, Paul J. Wisner, Ltd.,
Chicago, Illinois.
** J.D., University of Denver 1971; B.S., B.A., University of Denver 1969;
member Illinois, District of Columbia and Colorado Bars; Instructor of Law,
UT Chicago-Kent College of Law; Partner, Moylan & Early Ltd., Chicago,
Illinois.
1. 456 U.S. 353, 102 S. Ct. 1825 (1982). Curran was consolidated with
New York Mercantile Exch. v. Leist, 638 F.2d 283 (2d Cir. 1980), cert.
granted, 450 U.S. 910 (Feb. 23, 1981) (No. 80-757); Clayton Brokerage Co. v.
Leist, 638 F.2d 283 (2d Cir. 1980), cert. granted, 450 U.S. 910 (Feb. 23, 1981)
(No. 80-895); Heinold Commodities, Inc. v. Leist, 638 F.2d 283 (2d Cir. 1980),
cert. granted, 450 U.S. 910 (Feb. 23, 1981) (No. 80-936).
2. 7 U.S.C. §§ 1-24 (1976 & Supp. 1111978).
3. 422 U.S. 66 (1975). See infra notes 120-40 and accompanying text.
Indeed, some district courts have read Curran as establishing a new
test to determine whether a private right of action should be implied in certain legislation. These courts simply look to "the contemporary legal context" in which Congress was legislating. If judicial opinions allowed a
private right of action under existing legislation, and Congress took no subsequent legislative action to the contrary, the existence of a private right of
action could continue as being "sanctioned" in the "contemporary legal context" of the legislation. See, e.g., Jacobs v. Pabst Brewing Co., 549 F. Supp.
1050 (D.C. Del. 1982). Further analysis of this recent interpretation of Curran is outside the scope of this article. However, whether the Cofat meant
to supplant the detailed Cort analysis with Curran's simplistic approach
will probably be determined when the Court next considers the implied private action issue.
4. See Cort v. Ash, 422 U.S. 66 (1975). See also infra notes 120-40 and
accompanying text.
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of action under the CEA. As a prelude, a discussion of commodity futures trading and a historical overview of the governing law
will be presented. The appellate decisions in the two principle
consolidated actions, Curran and Leist, that affirmed the implication of a private right of action will be summarized. In addition, Rivers v. Rosenthal and Co.,5 a related Fifth Circuit case
where certiorariwas pending at the time Curran was decided,
will also be discussed. Rivers is interesting because the Fifth
Circuit denied a private right of action under the CEA, perhaps
adding impetus to the Court's grant of certiorariin the principal
6
cases.
The appellate courts in the foregoing actions each applied
Cort and reached different results. Therefore, a thorough understanding of the issues requires that the development of Cort
be traced, that its test be set forth, and its progeny analyzed.
The CEA, too, will be examined with special reference to the
private right of action issue. With the foregoing as background,
the arguments considered by the Supreme Court in Curran will
be discussed.
A significant body of argument and authority suggests that
Curran was wrongly decided. Justice Stevens' majority opinion
deviates from the principles enunciated in Cort and from recent
precedent where private rights of action were denied under various provisions of the federal securities laws. Had the facts and
arguments in Curran and Leist been analyzed using the Cort
criteria, a different and better result would have obtained. The
article will conclude with a suggestion for congressional action.
BACKGROUND

Commodity Futures Trading
A commodity futures contract is a standardized executory
7
agreement covering a fixed quantity of a particular commodity.
The seller of a contract is bound to deliver the specific quality or
grade of a commodity at a fixed future date at a fixed delivery
point. 8 The only variable is the price. The value of the commodity subject to the futures contract is determined by the laws of
5. 634 F.2d 774 (5th Cir. 1980), petitionfor cert. filed, 490 U.S.L.W. 2505
(U.S. March 10, 1982) (No. 80-1542). Rivers was subsequently vacated and
remanded to the appellate court for further consideration in light of Curran.
- U.S. -, 102 S. Ct. 2228 (1982). On remand, 686 F.2d 297 (5th Cir. 1982).
6. - U.S. -, 102 S. Ct. 1825, 1828 n.5 (1982).
7. Clark, Genealogy and Genetics of "Contractof Sale of a Commodity
for Future Delivery" in the Commodity Exchange Act, 27 EMORY L. J. 1175,

1178 (1978).
8. T. MIERONYmuS,

ECONOMICS OF FUTURES TRADING

36-40 (2d ed. 1977).
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supply and demand as expressed in trading on one of the nation's contract markets (an exchange).
A transaction in a commodity futures contract is initiated
when a customer contacts a futures commission merchant
(FCM) and places an order to either purchase or sell a designated futures contract for his account. The FCM is responsible
for executing and confirming the order and maintaining a record
of its customer's positions and completed transactions. 9 The
FCM is registered with the Commodity Futures Trading Commission (CFTC).1° The FCM transmits its customer's order to
the floor of the exchange. A floor broker positions himself at the
trading pit where other traders and floor brokers are trading the
same commodity. A contract is formed when two parties in the
pit, either acting for their respective accounts (traders or locals), or on behalf of a customer (floor broker), reach an agreement as to price. The transaction is recorded and disseminated
over the exchange's price reporting system.
All trades made each day are processed in the exchange's
clearing house.'" The role of the clearing house is to match all
purchases and sales and determine the FCM's daily margin requirement; that is, the good faith deposit posted to assure fulfillment of the futures contract.' 2 A FCM's daily margin
requirement will vary; sometimes the FCM will require a deposit of additional funds, while at other times the FCM will have
a credit balance in its clearing house account. The FCM, in turn,
requires margin from its customers. The margin requirements
are a small percentage of the total value of the futures contract.
As the price of the futures contract fluctuates, one party to the
trade has a profit, the other a loss. The FCM will demand additional margin from the customer on the losing end of the trade.
The buyer of the contract is said to be "long," the seller "short."
If after the transaction the price of the futures contract increases, the buyer has a profit; the difference between his
purchase price and the current, higher price. The seller has a
loss in the same amount. On the other hand, if the price of the
contract declines after the transaction, the seller has a profit,
which is the difference between his sale price and the current,
lower price. The buyer then has the loss.
Since the futures contracts are standardized, they are fungi9. Greenberg, On Being Regulated: Remarks By A Futures Commission Merchant, 6 HOFSTRA L. REV. 143, 145 (1977).
10. Id. at 144.

11. Not all FCMs are members of the clearing house. In such cases, the
FCM must contract with a member FCM to clear its trades.
12. Bianco, The Mechanics of Future Trading: Speculation and Manipulation, 6 HoFSTRA L. REV. 27, 34 (1977).
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ble. 1 3 The original parties to the transaction can close out their

positions by making an offsetting trade in the market. A party
who has a profit can realize it by placing an order opposite the
one he originally placed. A party with a losing position can cut
his loss by placing his order to offset his original position.
Stated simply, a buyer with a profitable position will place a sell
14
order; a seller with a profitable position will place a buy order.
If the party with the loss cannot deposit the maintenance margin demanded, the FCM will liquidate the contract on the exchange, and that party will be liable to the FCM for the deficit in
his account.
In reality, only about three per cent of all futures contracts
result in delivery. The vast majority of positions are offset or
liquidated prior to the contract expiration date.' 5 The value of
commodity futures trading is in its price discovery and riskshifting functions. Producers, manufacturers, processors, consumers, and others utilize the futures markets to determine future prices and thus "hedge" their market risk. Balancing the
equation is the speculator, who will assume the risk the hedger
seeks to avoid by taking the other side of a hedger's trade in the
6
hope of realizing a profit.'
History of Commodity Futures Legislation

The Futures Trading Act 17 was Congress' first attempt to
regulate commodity futures transactions. This legislation was
the result of demands for control due to post-World War I speculative excesses on the grain exchanges.' 8 The Act was quickly
declared unconstitutional in Hill v. Wallace 19 because it was
based on the taxing power of the federal Constitution. A tax
was levied on all futures contracts not traded on a designated
exchange. 20 The Act was redrafted to eliminate the penalty for
failure to pay the tax, substituting the penalty for unlawfully
dealing in commodity futures off a designated exchange. The
13. Leist v. Simplot, 638 F.2d 283, 286 (2d Cir. 1980). Fungible goods are

those capable of being exchanged or substituted for another, equivalent
unit. BLACK'S LAW DICTIONARY 607 (rev. 5th ed. 1979).
14. Bianco, supra note 12, at 34.
15. H.R. REP. No. 975, 93d Cong., 2d Sess. 130 (1974).
16. Clark, supra note 7, at 1205.
17. Act of August 24, 1921, ch. 86, 42 Stat. 187 (1921), superseded by The
Grain Futures Act, ch. 545, 42 Stat. 998 (1922).
18. The purpose of the Futures Trading Act was to tax grain futures contracts which were traded on nonlicensed exchanges. S. REP. No. 1131, 92d
Cong., 1st Sess. 1,reprinted in 1974 U.S. CODE CONG. &AD. NEWS 5843 [hereinafter cited as 1974 U.S. CODE CONG. &AD. NEWS].

19. 259 U.S. 44 (1922).
20. Id.
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other provisions of the 1921 Act 21 were maintained, and the Act

22
was renamed the Grain Futures Act.

Under the Grain Futures Act, the U.S. Department of Agriculture was vested with the authority to investigate possible
price manipulations. 23 As a result of the Department's recommendations for additional legislation, Congress conducted hearings from 1934 to 1936. The 1936 amendments resulted in
renaming the legislation the Commodity Exchange Act
(CEA). 24 The CEA adopted most of the previous Acts' provisions in which the only regulated commodity was grains. Cotwere added to the commodities
ton, butter and eggs, however, 25
covered by the new legislation.
The CEA gave a Commission, which consisted of the Secretaries of Agriculture and Commerce and the Attorney General,
authority to fix quantitative limits on an individual's trading of
commodity futures contracts. 26 An antifraud section was created,27 and registration of FCMs and floor brokers was required.28 The purpose of the Act was:
to deal with market abuses by traders generally as well as exchange members, to prosecute price manipulation as a criminal offense, to curb excessive speculation by the large market operator,
and to extend regulation to the previously uncovered field of commodity brokerage in order to suppress cheating, fraud, and fictiwhich were seriously impairing the
tious transactions in futures
29
services of the market.
Between 1936 and 1968, only minor amendments to the CEA
were made, basically adding additional commodities to the Act's
30
coverage.
The 1968 amendments made several changes: FCMs were
required to meet minimum specified financial standards; 31 live21. Both the 1921 and 1922 Acts limited commodity futures trading to
designated contract markets, vested the Secretary of Agriculture with the

power to designate a contract market, and created a penalty for contract
markets which failed to prevent price manipulation by their members.

22. Rainbolt, Regulating the Grain Gambler and His Successors, 6 HOFL. REV. 1, 7 (1977). The Grain Futures Act was held constitutional in

STRA

Board of Trade v. Olson, 262 U.S. 1 (1923).
23. 1974 U.S. CODE CONG. & AD. NEWS, supra note 18, at 5855.
24. 7 U.S.C. § 1 (1936).
25. Id. at § 2. See also 1974 U.S. CODE CONG. & AD. NEWS, supra note 18,
at 5855.

26. 7 U.S.C. § 6a(l) (1936). The power is based on the burden on interstate commerce which would result from any manipulation, the same rationale as that used in the Grain Futures Act.
27. Id. at § 6b.
28. Id. at §§ 6d-e.
29. 1974 U.S. CODE CONG. & Am. NEWS, supra note 18, at 5855.
30. 1974 U.S. CODE CONG. & AD. NEWS, supra note 18, at 5855.
31. 7 U.S.C. § 6f (1964 & Supp. IV 1968).
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stock and livestock products were included under the Act; 32 contract markets were required to keep adequate records of matters
discussed and actions taken; 33 and the Secretary of Agriculture
was given the power to issue cease-and-desist orders.34 No private right of action, however, was expressed in the
35
amendments.
The 1974 amendments constituted a radical departure from
the existing legislative scheme. The Act's scope, originally limited to agricultural commodity futures, was increased to include
all types of goods or services which are or might be sold by future delivery. 36 The newly established Commodity Futures
Trading Commission was given control over all operations of the
Commodity Exchange Commission and the Secretary of Agriculture under the CEA, including pending administrative proceedings. 37 The CFTC was given the power to bring an action to
enjoin a violation of the Act and to compel compliance through a
writ of mandamus. In addition, the Commission could disapprove rules and regulations made by a contract market. 38 New
recourse procedures for those aggrieved in commodity futures
transactions were established. Requirements for voluntary arbitration procedures for settlement of customer grievances and
claims not exceeding $15,000 were adopted.39 A party claiming
damages due to a violation of the CEA could initiate a reparations proceeding against any person registered pursuant to certain sections of the Act.4° Penalties for manipulation and
embezzlement were increased. 4 1 Again, no private right of action was expressed in the amendments. 42
32. Id. at § 2.
33. Id. at § 7a.
34. Id. at § 13a.
35. Even though the 1968 amendments did not expressly grant a private
right of action for parties injured as a result of CEA violations, courts did
imply a private remedy. See, e.g., Deaktor v. L.D. Schreiber &Co., 479 F.2d
529 (7th Cir. 1973), rev'd on other grounds sub nom. Chicago Mercantile
Exch. v. Deaktor, 414 U.S. 113 (1973); J.R. Booth Co. v. Peavey Co. Commodity Serv., 430 F.2d 132 (8th Cir. 1970); Arnold v. Bache & Co., 377 F. Supp. 61

(M.D. Pa. 1973); Johnson v. Arthur Espey, Shearson, Hammill & Co., 341 F.
Supp. 764 (S.D.N.Y. 1972); McCurnin v. Kohlmeyer &Co., 340 F. Supp. 1338
(E.D. La. 1972); United Egg Producers v. Bauer Int'l Corp., 311 F. Supp. 1375
(S.D.N.Y. 1970); Goodman v. H. Hentz &Co., 265 F. Supp. 440 (N.D. Mll. 1967).
36. 7 U.S.C. § 2 (1974).
37. Id. at § 4a.
38. Id.at § 12a(7).
39. Id.at § 7a(1l).
40. Id. at § 18(e). The alleged violation may be of the Act itself or any
rule, regulation, or order thereunder.
41. Id. at § 13a.
42. Post-1974 cases were split on whether a private right of action
should be implied. Cases in favor of a private remedy include Pollack v.
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The 1978 amendments were designed principally to
43
strengthen the regulation of the commodity futures industry.
In this connection, Congress prohibited any CFTC commissioner and certain employees from transacting business with
the CFTC for one year after leaving the CFTC44 and applied
antifraud provisions to registered and nonregistered advisers or
commodity pool operators.4 5 Further, the amendments created
a statutory cause of action under the CEA or CFTC regulations
whereby a state may seek injunctive relief in addition to proceedings under the applicable state criminal or civil antifraud
laws. 46 Criminal penalties for FCMs convicted of embezzlement
47
or manipulation were increased from $100,000 to $500,000.
CURRAN AND LEIST: THE APPELLATE DECISIONS
48
Curran v. Merrill Lynch, Pierce, Fenner & Smith, Inc.

In Curran, the plaintiffs were customers of the defendant
Merrill Lynch, a futures commission merchant. They alleged a
substantial financial loss as a result of the defendant's mismanagement of their discretionary commodity futures trading accounts. 4 9 The plaintiffs had opened accounts with Merrill Lynch
in order to trade commodity futures contracts. The written
agreement presented to and signed by the plaintiffs contained a
clause in which the plaintiffs agreed to submit any dispute arising out of the commodity account contract to arbitration within
one year after the claim arose. The plaintiffs alleged that they
were fraudulently induced to open discretionary accounts, and
that after opening the accounts the broker mismanaged them.
Citrus Assoc., 512 F. Supp. 711 (S.D.N.Y. 1981); Witzel v. Chartered Sys's

Corp., 490 F. Supp. 343 (D. Minn. 1980); Jones v. B.C. Christopher &Co., 466
F. Supp. 213 (D. Kan. 1979); R.J. Hereley &Son &Co. v. Stotler & Co., 466 F.
Supp. 345 (N.D. Ill. 1979); Hofmayer v. Dean Witter & Co., 459 F. Supp. 733
(N.D. Cal. 1978). Cases rejecting implied private rights of action include

Rivers v. Rosenthal & Co., 634 F.2d 774 (5th Cir. 1980); Stone v. Saxon &
Windsor Group, Ltd., 485 F. Supp. 1212 (N.D. Ill. 1980); Liang v. Hunt, 477 F.
Supp. 891 (N.D. Ill. 1979); National Super Spuds, Inc., v. New York Mercantile Exch., 470 F. Supp. 1256 (S.D.N.Y. 1979); Berman v. Bache, Halsey, Stuart, Shields, Inc., 467 F. Supp. 311 (S.D. Ohio 1979); Bartels v. International
Commodities Corp., 435 F. Supp. 865 (D. Conn. 1977).
43. S. REP. No. 850, 95th Cong., 2d Sess. 3, reprintedin 1978 U.S. CODE
CONG. & AD. NEWS 2087, 2089.

44.
45.
46.
47.
48.

7 U.S.C. § 4a(f) (2) (Supp. 1 1978).
Id. at § 6o.
Id. at § 13a-2.
Id. at § 13.
622 F.2d 216 (6th Cir. 1980). The Supreme Court opinion is found at

456 U.S. 353, 102 S. Ct. 1825 (1982).

accompanying text.
49. 622 F.2d at 219.

See infra notes 280, 296-321

and
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They also claimed that the accounts diminished in value due to
the broker's excessive trading and failure to observe "stop loss"
orders. Finally, despite plaintiffs' repeated requests, the broker
either refused to close the accounts or convinced the plaintiffs
not to do so.50
When the accounts were finally closed out, their value had
declined greatly, and the defendant had accrued a sizeable sum
in commissions. 5 1 In response to the complaint, Merrill Lynch
asserted an affirmative defense, stating that any customer participating in the accounts had been advised to be prepared to
risk the amount invested. Further, though Merrill Lynch agents
offered advice, the customer had the final decision whether to
52
buy or sell.
The district court in Curran did not apply the Cort test in
granting Merrill Lynch partial summary judgment.5 3 On appeal,
although several other issues were raised,54 the Sixth Circuit focused on the question of implying a private right of action under
the CEA.55 This issue was brought to the fore when the court
considered whether the arbitration agreement between the parties was the plaintiffs' exclusive remedy. 56 The Sixth Circuit applied Cort and determined that, notwithstanding the agreement
57
to arbitrate, a private right of action could be implied.
Leist v. Simplot
The consolidated action of Leist v. Simplot5 8 arose out of the
May, 1976, "Maine Potato" default on the New York Mercantile
Exchange.5 9 According to the Second Circuit's recitation of the
50. Id. at 220.
51. Id.
52. Id.
53. Id. at 230 n.19. See infra notes 122, 200-02 and accompanying text.
54. 622 F.2d at 219. Specifically, the other issues were whether a discretionary commodity futures trading account was a security entitling the
plaintiffs to the protection of the federal securities laws, and the propriety
of a stay pending arbitration.
55. Id. at 230. See infra note 204 and accompanying text.
56. Id. at 226-27.
57. Id. at 236.
58. 638 F.2d 283 (2d Cir. 1980).
59. The first action was National Super Spuds, Inc. v. New York Mercantile Exch., 470 F. Supp. 1256 (S.D.N.Y. 1979). This was a consolidation of
Leist v. Simplot, 76 Civ. 4350; Incomco v. New York Mercantile Exch., 76 Civ.
2648; National Super Spuds, Inc. v. New York Mercantile Exch., 76 Civ. 2375.
470 F. Supp. at 1257-58 n.l. In Leist, an action was brought against the defendant traders (short traders) and the FCMs that executed their trades,
stating that the group violated 7 U.S.C. § 13, which prohibits price manipulation. The FCMs were accused of failing to liquidate their customers' positions when the possible default became clear. An antitrust claim was also
brought. The long traders were charged with conduct violating 7 U.S.C.
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facts 60 in the original action, the defendants were individual

traders6 1 and several FCMs who executed their purchase orders. 62 The defendant traders established substantial short positions 63 in the May contract, allegedly to depress the price of
Maine-grown potatoes. 4 The short traders, it was asserted, sold
positions with the intent not to liquidate at a price higher than
they had previously agreed upon, and to default on deliveries if
necessary. 65 The plaintiffs alleged that the FCMs knew or
should have known that their customers (the short traders)
be able to cover their positions by
either could not or would not
66
purchasing May contracts.
The plaintiffs, long traders who speculatively purchased positions in the original action, were professional market traders
or dealers. 67 The long traders anticipated that the May contract
price would increase, and they would be able to liquidate their
positions at a profit.68 They acquired long positions which they

§§ 1-13. The exchange was charged with failing to maintain an orderly
market.
In Incomco, the complaint was brought against the long traders and the
exchange. The long traders were accused of creating an artificial railroad
car shortage in violation of the CEA. A charge against the exchange accused it of acting in concert with the long traders and failing to follow its
rules. In National Super Spuds, a class action was brought against the
short traders for violating applicable Exchange Rules and the CEA. The
exchange was accused of violating its own rules.
60. 638 F.2d 283, 285 (2d Cir. 1980).
61. Id. at 289. The individual defendants, Simplot and Taggares, were
both described as Idaho entrepreneurs who, with their separate processing
companies and their combined growing and warehousing operations, controlled the largest purchases of potatoes in the Northwest.
62. Id. at 289-90. The FCMs included the Clayton Brokerage Co. of St.
Louis, Inc., Heinold Commodities, Inc., and Thomson & McKinnon, Auchincloss, Kohlmeyer, Inc.
63. Id. at 289. A short position would require the holder to deliver
Maine potatoes to the holder of the long position or else be in default on the
contracts.
64. The court of appeals found:
The activities of the short conspirators were designed to counteract the
impact of these reports and other market information and rumors tending to raise the price of Maine futures. A decline in the price of potato
futures would suggest to those dealing in the cash market ... that supplies of Maine potatoes would be greater than earlier anticipated, and
that prices in spot transactions or negotiations for all potatoes should
correspondingly recede.
Id. at 289.
65. Id. The result of such tactics, allegedly, was to create the impression of a large supply of Maine potatoes, which, in turn, should depress the
price of the contract.
66. Id. at 290.
67. Id. These plaintiffs were Leist, a member of the exchange trading
on his own account, and Incomco, an FCM partnership managed by Smith.
68. Id. at 290-91. The court of appeals found that the plaintiffs were victims of a Maine growers' and traders' counter-conspiracy. The counter-con-
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were forced to sell at a loss 69 when the defendant short traders

did not offset their positions by the date the May contract trading ended. The "shorts" defaulted on their obligations to deliver.70 The "long" plaintiffs alleged that since the defendant
traders consolidated all their short contracts with the defendant
FCMs on the last day the May contracts could have been traded,
the FCMs either knew or should have known of the traders' intent to default.
Before the last trading date for the May contracts, the CFTC
warned the defendant traders that it was aware of their short
positions and possible price manipulation of the commodity, a
violation of the CEA.7 1 The CFTC's warning was not an accusation of price manipulation, but a threat that if any artificial pricing ensued during liquidation, a charge of price manipulation
under the CEA would be considered. 72 The New York Mercantile Exchange, also a defendant in the original action, was aware
of the defendant traders' actions. The Exchange's president met
with members of the eastern region of the CFTC but did not disclose the meetings to the Exchange's board of governors until
after the May contract date had expired.73 The plaintiffs alleged
that the Exchange did not reprimand the defendant traders and
did not follow its own rules, which required the Exchange to buy
in the cash market for the defendant traders' account the
74
amount of contracts necessary to cover the shorts.
The district court used the test elaborated by the Supreme
Court in Cort v. Ash 75 to deny a private right of action. 76 The
plaintiffs appealed and over a strong dissent by Judge Mansfield,
the Second Circuit reversed on the basis of Cort.77
spirators purchased long contracts and arranged to tie up the railroad cars

which could have delivered the May contract potatoes. Their intent was to
squeeze the defendants into taking a loss on the short contracts. The court
determined that the plaintiffs were caught in the middle of these factions,
neither of which would give in to the other.
69. Id. The court of appeals also noted that because the counter-conspiracy had effectively tied up available railroad cars, plaintiff Incomco
could not deliver its warehouse potatoes, leaving some 1.5 million pounds to
rot as the warm weather set in.
70. Id.

71. Id. at 290. The warning was given via telegram.
72. Id.

73. The appellate court found that "[t]he Exchange failed to declare an

emergency situation pursuant to its rules to facilitate an orderly liquidation, and, once trading had closed, failed to take appropriate steps such as
permitting delivery by truck or buying potatoes to cover the default of the
shorts." Id. at 291.
74. Id. at 292.
75. 422 U.S. 66 (1975). See infra notes 120-40 and accompanying text.
76. 470 F. Supp. 1256, 1263 (S.D.N.Y. 1979).
77. 638 F.2d 283, 322-23 (2d Cir. 1980).
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Meanwhile, the Fifth Circuit in Rivers v. Rosenthal & Co.78
had reversed the district court and had held that no private right
of action could be implied under the CEA.7 9 In Rivers, two customers of a brokerage house alleged that they suffered substantial losses in their commodity futures trading transactions as a
result of the actions of the FCM's agent.8 0 The customers
brought an action against the agent and the brokerage house as
his principal.8 ' A petition for a writ of certiorariwas granted by
82
the Supreme Court, but the action was temporarily stayed.
Thus, resolution of the disparate conclusions reached by the
Second Circuit in Leist, the Sixth Circuit in Curran, and the
Fifth Circuit in Rivers hinged on the Supreme Court's pending
decisions in Leist and Curran. The Supreme Court approached
the problem of determining whether an implied private right of
action existed by applying a historical perspective, but it
reached a surprising and, to many, a disconcerting result.
ORIGIN AND DEVELOPMENT OF THE IMPLIED PRIVATE RIGHT OF
ACTION DOCTRINE

The Supreme Court first sanctioned the doctrine of implied
private rights of action in Texas & Pacific Railway Co. v. Rigsby.8 3 In Rigsby, an injured railroad employee brought an action for damages against his employer arising out of a violation
of the Federal Safety Appliance Act.8 4 The Court found that the
purpose of the Act was "to promote the safety of employees and
travelers, '8 5 and that a proviso of the 1910 supplement to the Act
created a "liability in any remedial action for the death or injury
of any railroad employee. '8 6 The Act did not expressly confer a
private right of action for the death or injury of an employee.8 7
However, in light of its purpose, the Court found that if there is a
violation of the Act, which "results in damage to one of the class
for whose especial benefit the statute was enacted, the right to
recover the damages from the party in default is implied."88
78. 634 F.2d 774 (5th Cir. 1980), vacated, - U.S. -, 102 S. Ct. 2228, on
remand, 686 F.2d 297 (5th Cir. 1982).
79. 634 F.2d at 777.
80. Id.
81. Id.

82.
83.
84.
85.
86.
87.
88.

Rivers v. Rosenthal &Co., - U.S. -, 102 S. Ct. 2228 (1982).

241 U.S. 33 (1916).
Id. at 36. See 45 U.S.C. §§ 1-43 (1910).
241 U.S. at 39.
Id.
Id.

Id. This language appeared again in Cort v. Ash, 422 U.S. 66, 78
(1975), as the first factor in a four-prong test which determines whether a
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Despite the Rigsby holding, the application of a tort principle89 to create an implied private right of action was not widely
used by federal courts until the late 1940's.90 Under this approach, a court would look for whom and for what purpose the
statute was enacted. 91 If a statute was enacted to prohibit an
activity and a person was injured due to a violation of the statute, the injured party would have a remedy if he fell within the
protected class. 92 This approach could mean that a private right

of action may be implied in favor of any party injured as a result
93
of a violation of any federal statute proscribing some activity.

The doctrine of implied private rights of action recognized
in Rigsby was extended to securities legislation in J.I. Case
Company v. Borak.94 There the Court held that a private action
can be brought by a shareholder against a corporation under
section 14(a) of the Securities Exchange Act of 1934 (Exchange
Act).95 The shareholder alleged a deprivation of his preemptive
rights as a result of a corporate merger. 96 The plaintiff also
claimed a violation of section 14(a) of the Exchange Act based
on the fraudulent proxy materials which encouraged support for
the merger.9 7 The shareholder sought both a declaratory judgprivate right of action may be implied under a statute. See infra notes 12040 and accompanying text.
The Rigsby Court based its opinion on an earlier, similar case, Southern Ry. Co. v. United States, 222 U.S. 20 (1911). The Act's scope covered
interstate commerce and the railroad disclaimed any liability because the
violation of the Act occurred during an intrastate journey. The Court dismissed the distinction, stating that the same cars were used for both interand intrastate commerce and the cars were often interchanged. Id. at 27.
89. This principle was later adopted by RESTATEMENT
TORTS

(SECOND)

OF

§ 286 (1965).

90. See, e.g., Tunstall v. Brotherhood of Locomotive Firemen & Enginemen, 323 U.S. 210 (1944); Reitmeister v. Reitmeister, 162 F.2d 691 (2d Cir.
1947); Kardon v. National Gypsum Co., 69 F. Supp. 512 (E.D. Pa. 1946). See
also Neiswonger v. Goodyear Tire & Rubber Co., 35 F.2d 761 (N.D. Ohio
1929).

91. See, e.g., Kardon v. National Gypsum Co., 69 F. Supp. 512 (E.D. Pa.
1946). This action alleged a violation of § 10(b) and Rule 10b-5 of the Securities Exchange Act. The federal court held that an implied private right of
action existed because the broad purpose of the Securities Exchange Act
was to regulate securities transactions so that manipulations or deceptive
practices could either not take place or not go unpunished. Id. at 514.
92. Texas &Pac. Ry. Co. v. Rigsby, 241 U.S. 33, 39 (1916).
93. In Tunstall v. Brotherhood of Locomotive Firemen &Enginemen, 323
U.S. 210 (1944), the Court stated: "We also hold that the right asserted by
petitioner which is derived from the duty imposed by the Railway Labor
Act on the Brotherhood, as a bargaining representative, is a federal right
implied from the statute and the policy it has adopted." Id. at 213. The violation of a statutorily created "duty" gives rise to liability.
94. 377 U.S. 426 (1964).
95. Id. at 432.
96. Id. at 429-30.
97. Id. at 429.
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ment that the merger was void and damages for himself and
other similarly situated shareholders. 98 The Court found that
the main purpose of section 14(a) was to protect investors such
as the plaintiff from false or misleading proxy solicitations. 9 9 A
denial of a private right of action would render a result contrary
to this purpose. x 0 The Court's opinion in Borak mirrored its
opinion in Texas & Pacific Railway.1°1 Both cases established
that if a statute's purpose is to benefit a special class and the
plaintiff is a member of that class injured by a harm the statute
had been designed to protect against, the plaintiff is then entitled to bring a private action.
The Supreme Court further refined its approach to the implied private right of action issue in National RailroadPassen102
ger Corp. v. National Association of Railroad Passengers.
The Court's previous tests would almost always result in the implication of a private right of action, but here it adopted a more
stringent test which signalled the start of a new trend.10 3 In National Railroad, the National Association of Railroad Passengers (NARP) sought to enjoin the cancellation of several
passenger train services based upon a prohibition in the Rail
Passenger Service Act of 1970.104 NARP claimed that railroad
passengers were the Act's intended beneficiaries and that a private action to force compliance with the Act should be allowed. 10 5 The Court rejected this argument, stating that "the
inference of such a private cause of action not otherwise authorized by the statute must be consistent with the evident legislative intent and, of course, with the effectuation of the purposes
intended to be served by the Act."' 1 6 In the Court's opinion, an
98. Id. at 430. The Court found that the damages which the plaintiff suffered were the result of the corporation's actions against all shareholders;
therefore, a derivative action was allowed.
99. Id. at 432.
100. Id. However, there is an ambiguity within the Borak opinion. The
Court does not expressly state whether an implied private right of action
arose because § 27 of the Exchange Act grants exclusive jurisdiction over
"all suits in equity and actions at law brought to enforce a liability or duty
created" under the Act, id. at 430, 431, or merely because of the purpose of
§ 14(a).
101. 241 U.S. 33 (1916). See supra notes 83-93 and accompanying text.
102. 414 U.S. 453 (1974).
103. In Cort v. Ash, 422 U.S. 66 (1975), the Court saw National Railroad
as a signal to lower courts to defer from implying private remedies.
104. 45 U.S.C. §§ 501-645 (1976). This Act prohibited railroads from stopping intercity passenger train service prior to January 1, 1975, unless the
railroad had entered into a contract with Amtrak pursuant to § 561(a) (1).
Since the railroad discontinued service without having entered into such a
contract, the NARP alleged that it did so in violation of the Act.
105. 414 U.S. 453, 457 (1974).
106. Id. at 458.
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action brought by the NARP would not achieve this result.
In determining whether the remedies created under the Rail
Passenger Service Act were the exclusive means of enforcement, the Court applied the principle expressio unius est exclusio alterius,0 7 and answered in the affirmative. 0 8 This
approach yielded a result in conflict with Borak, which placed
the interests of the beneficiary at the forefront of any consideration. 10 9 Thus the intent of the legislature became crucial in determining whether a private right of action should be implied.
Employing this new consideration, the majority found that the
statute in question contemplated that the Attorney General
would be the exclusive authority to enforce the Act. 110 Private
actions could be brought for labor issues only by "duly authorized employee representatives.""' The NARP could not, in light
of the statute's language and legislative intent, bring a private
action to compel compliance with the Act. 112 As a direct result
of this decision, Borak was clearly diminished in importance.
Legislative intent was again considered by the Supreme
Court in Securities Investor Protection Corp. v. Barbour.113 In

Barbour,the issue was whether customers of a failed securities
brokerage house had an implied private right of action against
the Securities Investor Protection Corp. (SIPC). The SIPC is a
nonprofit membership corporation created by statute to provide
financial relief to customers of failed brokerage houses with
whom the customer has deposited cash or securities. 114 The
Court commented that, as with National Railroad,115 Congress
created a corporate entity, vested with enforcement powers, to
solve a public problem. The implication of a private right of action would be inconsistent with both legislative intent and the
Act's purposes.
107. "Expression of one thing is the exclusion of another." BLACK'S LAW

DICTIONARY 521 (rev. 5th ed. 1979). Stated simply, this rule of construction
dictates that when a statute expressly provides for one alternative, any
other alternative is impliedly rejected.
108. 414 U.S. at 461.
109. 377 U.S. 426 (1964). See supra notes 94-100 and accompanying text.
This consideration would become the second and most important prong of
the Cort test. See Cort v. Ash, 422 U.S. 66, 78 (1975). See also infra notes
120-40 and accompanying text.
110. 414 U.S. at 464.

111. Id. at 460.
112. Id.
113. 421 U.S. 412 (1975). See also Middlesex County Sewerage Auth. v.

National Sea Clammers Ass'n, 453 U.S. 1 (1981); California v. Sierra Club,
451 U.S. 287 (1981); Texas Indus., Inc. v. Radcliff Materials, Inc., 451 U.S. 630
(1981); Universities Research Ass'n v. Coutu, 450 U.S. 754 (1981).
114. 15 U.S.C. §§ 78aaa-lll (1976).
115. 414 U.S. 453 (1974). See supra notes 102-12 and accompanying text.
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Lower federal courts followed the Supreme Court's attitude
about implying a private right of action where other federal statutes were at issue. In Taylor v. Brighton Corp.,116 discharged

employees who reported unsafe working conditions brought an
action against their former employer under the Occupational
Safety and Health Act.1 17 The Sixth Circuit, focusing on legislative intent, found that Congress intended only the Secretary of
Labor to have enforcement powers. To allow a private right of
action would be inconsistent with the statute's enforcement
provisions.
The Sixth Circuit also denied an implied private right of action under the Bankruptcy Act. 118 In Ryan v. Ohio Edison
Co .,119 debtors who had been discharged in bankruptcy filed a
class action against a utility company when the company used
informal methods of collecting the debts from them. The court
determined that the congressional intent underlying the Bankruptcy Act was to proscribe lawsuits in the state courts against
discharged debtors. The court refused to expand this purpose
by implying a private right of action to enjoin informal
collections.
THE CORT v. ASH TEST

A more elaborate test to determine whether a private action
should be implied evolved in Cort v. Ash. 120 The Court refined
12 1
the criteria previously adopted and added two new elements.
The new test consists of four independent determinations:
First, is the plaintiff 'one of the class for whose especial benefit the
statute was enacted'.

.

. ? Second, is there any indication of legis-

lative intent, explicit or implicit, either to create a remedy or deny
one? ...

Third, is it consistent with the underlying purposes of the

legislative scheme to imply such a remedy for the plaintiff?...
And finally, is the cause of action one traditionally relegated to
state law, in an area basically the concern of the States, so that it
would be inappropriate to infer a cause of action based solely on
federal law?122
116. 616 F.2d 256 (6th Cir. 1980).
117. 29 U.S.C. § 660(c) (1979). This statute prohibits any retaliatory discharge of or discrimination against employees who report OSHA violations,
and charges the Secretary of Labor to investigate and prosecute meritorious claims of retaliation.
118. 11 U.S.C. §§ 101-109 (1982).
119. 611 F.2d 1170 (6th Cir. 1979).
120. 422 U.S.66 (1975).
121. 422 U.S. at 78. The four prongs of the test are not necessarily given
equal weight.
122. Id. The Cort test would seem to be a synthesis and refinement of
previous decisions. Texas &Pac. Ry. Co. v. Rigsby, 241 U.S. 33 (1915) and J.I.
Case Co. v. Borak, 377 U.S. 426 (1964) serve as the basis for the first prong-
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In Cort, a shareholder of Bethlehem Steel Corp. brought an
action against the board of directors seeking both damages in
favor of Bethlehem and injunctive relief based on a violation of
federal law, 123 alleging that the board of directors used corporate funds to pay for 1972 presidential election advertisements.
This was alleged to be violative of federal criminal statutes
prohibiting corporations from making contributions in conjunction with specified federal elections. 124 The district court
granted the defendants' motion for summary judgment, 125 but
the court of appeals reversed, finding a private cause of action
could be implied under the statute. 126 The Supreme Court, applying its new test, found that a private right of action could not
127
be implied under the statute.
Under the Cort facts, the Court found that the shareholder
was not a member of the class for whose "especial" benefit the
statute was enacted. 128 The Court stated that "the legislation
was primarily concerned with corporations as a source of aggregated wealth and therefore of possible corrupting influence, and
not directly with the internal relations between the corporations
and their stockholders.' 1 29 Elaborating more on the standards
used to determine whether a private remedy should be implied,
the Court commented that there were two situations where such
a right would be appropriate: where there existed either a
"clearly articulated federal right in the plaintiff,"'130 or a "pervasive legislative scheme governing the relationship between the
131
plaintiff class and the defendant class in a particular regard."'
Further, the second prong of the test, requiring an express
or implied indication of congressional intent to vest a private
right in the plaintiff, was not met. 132 A plaintiff who is clearly
whether plaintiff is a member of the class for whose benefit the statute was
enacted. Cort v. Ash, 422 U.S. 66, 78 (1975). See supra notes 83-101 and accompanying text. National R.R. Passenger Corp. v. National Ass'n of R.R.
Passengers, 414 U.S. 453 (1973) gave rise to the second and third prongs.
The fourth requirement is also found in Borak.
123. 422 U.S. 66 (1975).
124. Id. The statute at issue was 18 U.S.C. § 610 (1976).
125. Ash v. Cort, 350 F. Supp. 227 (E.D. Pa. 1972).
126. 496 F.2d 416 (3d Cir. 1974). Even though the election had taken
place, the matter was deemed not to be moot. Id.at 424.
127. 422 U.S. 66 (1975).
128. Id. at 82.
129. Id.
130. Id.
131. Id. at 82. See J.I Case Co. v. Borak, 377 U.S. 426 (1964). See also
supra notes 94-101 and accompanying text.
132. 422 U.S at 82. See National R.R. Passenger Corp. v. National Ass'n of
R.R. Passengers, 414 U.S. 453 (1974). See also supra notes 102-12 and accompanying text.
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within the class granted certain rights does not have to prove
the intent to create a private cause of action. 133 It is instead the
legislative intent to deny a private right of action which is controlling. 3 4 Since the plaintiff did not adduce any evidence of intent in favor of an implied private remedy, the Court found the
existence of a congressional intent to deny the right and to continue the application of state law to the relationship between
35
corporation and shareholder.
The plaintiff also failed to satisfy the third prong of the new
test. a3 The primary congressional goal-preventing the use of
corporate funds in campaigns for federal offices-would not be
achieved by implying a private right under the statute. 137 The
Court noted that the impact of the action would be minimal because the board of directors could circumvent the issue by "borrowing" from the corporation's funds and repaying the funds
13
only if compelled to do so at a later date.
Finally, the Court found that under the fourth prong of the
test it would be inappropriate to infer a federal remedy. Corporations were found to be "creatures of state law."'139 The existence of state law remedies precluded the need for protection
under federal law.14°
THE APPLICATION OF CORT V. ASH TO OTHER LEGISLATION

The Cort decision demonstrated the Supreme Court's unwillingness to imply private rights of action. Case law involving
other types of legislation indicates that, absent express statutory language creating private remedies or other compelling circumstances, Congress' silence on the issue will lead to the
conclusion that no private right of action should be implied.
In two recent decisions, Touche Ross & Co. v. Redington"41
and Transamerica Mortgage Advisors, Inc. v. Lewis, 142 the
Supreme Court continued its campaign to limit implied private
rights of action. Both cases were brought under the federal se133. 422 U.S. at 82.
134. Id.
135. Id. at 83.
136. Id. at 84.
137. Id.
138. Id.
139. Id.
140. Id. at 85. The Court recognized that this point was considered in J.I.
Case Co. v. Borak, 377 U.S. 426, 434-35 (1964), where it was reasoned that
when no state law remedy exists, the purpose of the federal statute would
be thwarted if a private remedy was not implied.
141. 442 U.S. 560 (1979).
142. 444 U.S. 11 (1979).
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In Touche Ross, the Court commented:

To the extent our analysis in today's decision differs from that of
the Court in Borak, it suffices to say that in a series of cases since
Borak we have adhered to a stricter standard for the implication of
private causes of action, and we follow that stricter standard today.
The ultimate question is one of congressional intent, not one of
whether this Court thinks that it can improve upon the statutory
scheme that Congress enacted into law.14
In Touche Ross & Co. v. Redington, 45 the Supreme Court
held that no implied right of action existed under section 17(a)
of the Exchange Act. 14 This was an action by a court-appointed
trustee in liquidation and the SIPC 147 against an accounting firm

which audited the insolvent brokerage house's books. The
plaintiffs alleged that had the accounting firm performed a
proper audit, the precarious financial position of the brokerage
house would have been discovered, and the customers would
not have suffered losses.148
Section 17(a) of the Exchange Act' 49 requires broker-dealers to keep such records and file such reports as the SEC
prescribes. Conceding that in the past private remedies had
been implied in certain instances, the Court noted that this particular statute had neither "prohibited certain conduct [n]or
created federal rights in favor of private parties," but required
only that certain records be maintained. 5 0 An examination of
5l
the legislative history revealed nothing relating to remedies.'
Under these circumstances, the Court would not infer a private
remedy. 152 The existence of express private remedies in other
sections of the Act provided the Court with further justification
153
for denying the claim.
143. In both cases the legislation at issue proscribed certain conduct for
the regulated parties but contained no express provision for civil liability.
144. 442 U.S. 560, 578 (1979).
145. 442 U.S. 560 (1979).

146. Id. at 569. This section is codified at 15 U.S.C. § 78q(a) (1976).
147. The SIPC, or Securities Investor Protection Corporation, was created by the Securities Investor Protection Act, 15 U.S.C. § 78aaa (1976). See
supra note 114 and accompanying text. The SIPC is a nonprofit organization comprised of securities dealers. These dealers contribute to a fund
which is used to compensate brokerage firm customers who have incurred
losses as a result of securities broker-dealer insolvencies. 442 U.S. 560, 564
n.5 (1979). See also Securities Investor Protection Corp. v. Barbour, 421 U.S.
412 (1975).
148. 442 U.S. 560, 566 (1979).
149. 15 U.S.C. § 78q(a) (1976).
150. 442 U.S. at 569. See Cannon v. University of Chicago, 441 U.S. 667
(1979); Johnson v. Railway Express Agency, Inc., 421 U.S. 454 (1975); J.L
ase Co. v. Borak, 377 U.S. 426 (1964).
151. 442 U.S. at 571.

152. Id.
153. Id. at 572.
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In Transamerica Mortgage Advisors, Inc. v. Lewis, 5 4 a
shareholder of Morgan Trust of America brought a derivative action against several trustees, an investment adviser, and two
corporations affiliated with the investment adviser. 55 The suit
alleged three causes of action arising out of violations of the Investment Advisers Act of 1940.156 The Court noted that the Act
did not expressly provide for any private cause of action and
only one section authorized the SEC to bring suit in a federal
5 7
district court to enjoin any violations.
The Court found that a statute which proscribes certain conduct and does not create or alter civil liabilities does not give
rise to an implied private remedy. 158 The section of the statute
which voids the rights of those contracting in violation of the Investment Advisers Act was construed to give the injured party
the right to rescind the contract.1 5 9 The majority found this to
be the only private remedy available under the Act. 160 Therefore, no private right of action for damages was implied.
In an earlier case, Piperv. Chris-CraftIndustries,Inc., 61 the
Court applied the Cort test and held that an unsuccessful tender
offeror was not entitled to a private right of action for damages
under section 14(e)' 62 of the Securities Exchange Act or under
SEC rule lOb-6.163 On the section 14(e) issue, the Court found
that Chris-Craft (the tender offeror) was not a member of the
class for whose especial benefit the statute was enacted, but was
rather a member of the class that Congress intended to regulate.'6 In addition, no legislative intent was demonstrated to indicate that tender offerors should be given "additional weapons
154. 444 U.S. 11 (1979).
155. Id. at 13.
156. Investment Advisers Act of 1940, § 206, 15 U.S.C. § 80b-6 (1976). The
statute provides, in part, that it is unlawful for an investment adviser "by
use of the mails or any means or instrumentality of interstate commerce,
directly or indirectly-(1) to employ any device, scheme, or artifice to defraud any client or prospective client; [and] (2) to engage in any transaction, practice, or course of business which operates as a fraud or deceit
upon any client or prospective client. . . ." Id.
157. 444 U.S. at 14. The Court was referring to 15 U.S.C. § 80b-9 (1976).
158. 444 U.S. at 19.
159. Id. The Court was referring to § 80b-15, which provides that contracts whose performance or formation would violate the Act "shall be void
... as regards the rights of.. ." the violator or anyone acquiring rights
thereunder with knowledge of the facts making performance of the contract
a violation.
160. 444 U.S. at 20.
161. 430 U.S. 1 (1977).
162. 15 U.S.C. § 78n(e) (1976).
163. 17 C.F.R. § 240.10b-6 (1981).
164. 430 U.S. at 37.
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in the form of an implied cause of action for damages. '165 The
Court also reasoned that an implied private action would not be
consistent with the "underlying purposes of the legislative
scheme."'166 Finally, the Court stated that the defeated tender
offeror had opportunities for remedies under state laws, i.e., "interference with a prospective commercial advantage."' 167 The
Court also found that Chris-Craft lacked standing to sue under
68
rule lOb-6.1
Title IX of the Education Amendments of 1972169 provided
yet another opportunity for the Court to apply Cort. In Cannon
v. University of Chicago,170 the Supreme Court found the requisite legal intent to create a private right of action in favor of a
medical school applicant who claimed discrimination based on
gender. In applying Cort, the Court first determined that Title
IX expressly conferred a benefit on applicants discriminated
against by sex and that this applicant was a member of the class
for whose especial benefit the statute was enacted. 17 1 Second,
165. Id. at 38.
166. In reaching this conclusion, the Court cited the Williams Act, which
amended the Securities Exchange Act of 1934 by adding §§ 13(d) and (e),
and §§ 14(d), (e), and (f). 15 U.S.C. §§ 78m(a) and (e) and §§ 78n(d), (e),
and (f) (1976), respectively. The Court stated, "As a disclosure mechanism
aimed especially at protecting shareholders of target corporations, the Williams Act cannot consistently be interpreted as conferring a monetary remedy upon regulated parties, particularly where the award would not
redound to the direct benefit of the protected class." 430 U.S. at 39.
167. Id. at 40-41. The Supreme Court stated that, "Congress is, of course,
free to create a remedial scheme in favor of contestants in tender offers
.... " Id. The conclusion was that it was "entirely appropriate" to relegate
the tender offeror to whatever state law remedies were available. Id. at 41.
168. Id. at 45. The dissent argued that § 14(e) implicitly granted a private
right of action and that the determinative issue was who may invoke this
remedy. It was contended that the plaintiff met the Cort test because it was
a member of the class the statute was intended to benefit. Id. at 55 (Stevens, J., dissenting). In the alternative, the dissent claimed that Borak,
rather than Cort was controlling. The distinction between the two cases
was only one of approach; i.e., a derivative suit or a suit brought in the cororation's own right. Id. at 67. The dissent reasoned that the purpose of
14(e) is to protect shareholders, including tender offerors; this was especially true for those who had accepted Chris-Craft's offer, thereby tendering
their shares. Id. at 69.
169. Title IX of the Education Amendments of 1972, § 901, 86 Stat. 235, 20
U.S.C. §§ 1681-1686 (1976). The relevant portion of the statute provides
that "No person in the United States shall, on the basis of sex, be excluded
from participation in, be denied the benefits of, or be subjected to discrimination under any education program or activity receiving Federal financial
assistance. . .

."

20 U.S.C. § 1681(a) (1976).

170. 441 U.S. 677 (1979). The district court dismissed the action because
Title IX does not expressly authorize a private right of action, and none
could be implied. Id. at 683. The court of appeals affirmed. Id. at 680.
171. Id. at 694. The Court also commented,
Not surprisingly, the right-or duty-creating language of the statute
has generally been the most accurate indicator of the propriety of impli-
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the Court stated it is "always appropriate to assume" that Congress was aware of prior case law and was therefore cognizant of
previous judicial treatment of statutes. 172 Combining both Congress' knowledge of the law and its intent to create Title IX rem-

edies comparable to Title VI remedies, which authorize a
private right of action for those discriminated against, the majority concluded that Congress also intended that a private right of
action be implied in this case. 173 The Department of Health, Education, and Welfare's opinion that an implied private remedy
would not frustrate the underlying purpose of the statute satisfied the Cort test's third prong.' 74 The fourth requirement was
met on the ground that the expenditure of federal funds and the
roles of the federal government and courts as protectors against
175
discrimination supported the utilization of a federal remedy.
Justice Powell's dissent focused on his perception of the unconstitutional course the Court initiated in Cort. 176 He stated:
Cort allows the Judicial Branch to assume policymaking authority
vested by the Constitution in the Legislative Branch. It also invites
Congress to avoid resolution of the often controversial question
whether a new regulatory statute should be enforced through private litigation. Rather than confronting the hard political choices
involved, Congress is encouraged to shirk its constitutional obligation and leave the issue to the courts to decide. When this happens, the legislative process with its public scrutiny and
participation has been bypassed, with the attendant prejudice to
everyone concerned. Because the courts are free to reach a result
different from that which the normal play of political forces would
have produced, the intended beneficiaries of the legislation are uncation of a cause of action. With the exception of one case, in which the
relevant statute reflected a special policy against judicial inference, this
Court has never refused to imply a cause of action where the language
of the statute explicitly conferred a right directly on a class of persons
that included the plaintiff in the case.
Id. at 690 n.13.
172. Id. at 697-98. The Court went further and stated that not only is it
inappropriate but also unrealistic to presume Congress is not familiar with
Supreme Court and federal court precedents. Id. at 699.
173. Id. at 703.
174. Id. at 706. The Court stated,
It has been suggested that, at least in absence of an exhaustion requirement, private litigation will interfere with HEW's enforcement procedures ....

The simple answer to this suggestion is that the

Government itself perceives no such interference under the circumstances of this case, and argues that if the possibility of interference
arises in another case, appropriate action can be taken by the relevant
court at that time.
Id. at 706 n.41.
175. Id. at 708-09. The Supreme Court added that the matter was not of
state concern because, "(s] ince the Civil War, the Federal Government and
the federal courts have been the 'primary and powerful reliances' in protecting citizens against such discrimination." Id.
176. Id. at 742 (Powell, J., dissenting).
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able to ensure
the full measure of protection their needs may
177
warrant.
THE COMMODITY EXCHANGE ACT
The first federal court to deal with the issue of implied private remedies under the Commodity Exchange Act used the
same tort principle enunciated in National Railroad.1 78
In
Goodman v. H. Hentz and Co .,179 a district court found that defrauded commodity investors were within the class of persons
Congress sought to protect when it enacted section 6b of the
CEA. 180 The absence of any congressional intent to the contrary
led the court to find the existence of an implied private remedy. 1 81 The Goodman court analogized from a similar remedy
available under section 10(b) of the Exchange Act, and determined the same remedy should be available under the antifraud
18 2
provision of the CEA.
The holding in Goodman became the basis for other federal
court decisions which affirmed the existence of private actions
under the CEA. 183 Subsequent case law generated little analysis on the issue; courts merely assumed, based on Goodman,
that such a private remedy existed. In Deaktor v. L. D. Schreiber
and Co. ,184 the Seventh Circuit extended the Goodman holding
by recognizing a private right of action against manipulative and
177. Id. at 743. Justice Powell considered the statutory remedy of fund
termination sufficient to deter violations of Title IX by educational institutions. Id. at 748-49. He warned that overlapping judicial and administrative
enforcement of the statute would lead to "conflicts and confusion," thereby
thwarting the statute's goals. Id. at 749. Cf. Northwest Airlines, Inc. v.
Transport Workers Union, 451 U.S. 77 (1981) (no private right of action
under the Equal Pay Act, 29 U.S.C. § 206d (1976), and Title VII of the Civil
Rights Act, 42 U.S.C. §§ 2000e-2000e-17 (1976 and Supp. 1979)); Universities
Research Ass'n v. Coutu, 450 U.S. 754 (1981) (no implied remedy under Davis-Bacon Act, 40 U.S.C. § 276a (1976)).
178. 414 U.S. 453 (1974). See supra notes 102-12 and accompanying text.
179. 265 F. Supp. 440 (N.D. Ill. 1967).
180. Id. at 447. The section states it is unlawful for an employee of a
member of a commodity market to defraud an investor. 7 U.S.C. § 13a
(1976).
181. 265 F. Supp. at 447.
182. Id. at 444.
183. See Miller v. New York Produce Exch., 550 F.2d 762 (2d Cir.), cert.
denied, 434 U.S. 823 (1977); Booth v. Peavey Co. Commodity Serv., 430 F.2d
132 (8th Cir. 1970); Seligson v. New York Produce Exch., 378 F. Supp. 1076
(S.D.N.Y. 1974); Johnson v. Arthur Epsey, Shearson, Hamill & Co., 341 F.
Supp. 764 (S.D.N.Y. 1972); McCurnin v. Kohlmeyer, 340 F. Supp. 1338 (E.D.
La. 1972); United Egg Producers v. Bauer Int'l Corp., 311 F. Supp. 1375
(S.D.N.Y. 1970); Anderson v. Francis I. duPont & Co., 291 F. Supp. 705 (D.
Minn. 1968); Hecht v. Harris, Upham & Co., 283 F. Supp. 417 (N.D. Cal. 1968).
184. 479 F.2d 529 (7th Cir.), rev'd on other grounds sub nom., Chicago
Mercantile Exch. v. Deaktor, 414 U.S. 113 (1973).
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fraudulent practices by floor brokers. 185
Closely related to the question of the existence of a private
remedy was the question of whether federal courts had jurisdiction over commodity law violations or whether the Commodity
Exchange Commission 186 had primary jurisdiction. 187 The issue
became more important after the 1974 amendments to the CEA.
The passage of the Commodity Futures Trading Commission
Act 188 (CFTCA) created questions regarding the survival of private remedies.
The purpose of the Commodity Futures Trading Commission (CF'C) was to support the commodity exchanges' regulatory efforts at eliminating unfair trading practices by providing a
"strong Federal regulatory umbrella."' 18 9 The CFTC was empowered to do the following: compel exchanges to enforce their
own rules; 190 alter or supplement such rules upon due notice; 19 1
initiate administrative proceedings against anyone who violates
statutes or exchange regulations and assess penalties; 192 and issue cease-and-desist orders. 193 In addition, the Commission was
given jurisdiction
over
administrative
reparations
194
proceedings.
The judicial responses to the 1974 amendments conflicted in
several respects. Some courts determined that the remedies
created by the 1974 amendments were supplemental rather than
exclusive, thereby permitting the commencement of private actions without exhaustion of administrative remedies. 9 5 In some
cases the continued existence of an implied private remedy was
presumed without a.Cort analysis. 196 Other courts held that private actions were not extinguished by the 1974 amendments but
that the plaintiff must first exhaust his administrative reme185. 479 F.2d at 534. The Seventh Circuit has consistently found an implied private right of action under the CEA. See, e.g., Hirk v. Agri-Research
Council, Inc., 561 F.2d 96 (7th Cir. 1977); Case & Co., Inc. v. Board of Trade,

523 F.2d 355 (7th Cir. 1975).
186. The Commodity Exchange Commission was the precursor of the
Commodity Futures Trading Commission (CFTC), created in 1974.
187. Deaktor v. L.D. Schreiber & Co., 479 F.2d 529, 532 (7th Cir. 1973). See
also Ricci v. Chicago Mercantile Exch., 409 U.S. 289 (1973).
188. 7 U.S.C. §§ 1-24 (1976).
189. H.R. REP. No. 975, 93d Cong., 2d Sess. 48 (1974).

190.
191.
192.
193.
194.
195.
196.

7 U.S.C. § 7a(8) (1976).
7 U.S.C. § 12a(7) (1976).
7 U.S.C. § 9 (1976).
7 U.S.C. § 13a (1976 & Supp. V 1980).
7 U.S.C. § 18(c) (Supp. 1980).
Smith v. Groover, 468 F. Supp. 105 (N.D. Ill.
1979).
Ames v. Merrill Lynch, Pierce, Fenner & Smith, Inc., 567 F.2d 1174

(2d Cir. 1977). See also supra cases cited at note 42.
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dies. 1 97 Finally, a number of courts found that both the 1974
amendments and the Cort test eliminated the implied private
remedy. 198
Two courts which found implied private remedies under the
CEA held that such actions could be brought without first exhausting administrative remedies, i.e., reparations proceedings.
In Smith v. Groover' 99 and Curran v. Merrill Lynch, Pierce, Fenner & Smith, Inc.,200 the courts found that the basic congressional policy contemplated in the amendments was that the
"jurisdiction conferred on Federal and State courts .. .under
the laws of the United States or any State are retained. '20 1 The
power of the CFTC to bring a variety of administrative proceedings has been described in the following manner.
vesting in the Commission... the authority to have administrative
law judges and apply a broad spectrum of civil and criminal penalties is likewise not intended to interfere with the courts in any way.
It is hoped that giving the Commission this authority will somewhat lighten the burden upon the courts, but the entire appeal process and the
right of final determination by the courts are expressly
20 2
preserved.
Even the CFTC interpreted the CFTCA as implicitly authorizing
private actions. It also asserted that this right survived the 1974
amendments because Congress did not expressly abolish pri20 3
vate remedies at that time.
After finding that the CFTC did not have exclusive primary
jurisdiction, the Smith and Curran courts questioned whether a
private right of action existed. Both decisions applied the Cort
test and answered in the affirmative. 2° 4 The first element of the
test, whether the plaintiff is a member of the class for whose
especial benefit the statute was enacted, was satisfied by an ex197. See, e.g., Bartels v. International Commodities Corp., 435 F. Supp.
865 (D. Conn. 1977).
198. See, e.g., Berman v. Bache, Halsey, Stuart, Shields, Inc., 467 F. Supp.
311 (S.D. Ohio 1979). See also supra cases cited at note 42.
199. 468 F. Supp. 105, 112 (N.D. 1ll.
1979).
200. 622 F.2d 216, 232 (6th Cir. 1980).
201. Smith v. Groover, 468 F. Supp. at 111 (quoting Senator Hubert H.
Humphrey, 120 CONG. REc. 35,000 (1974)). See also Witzel v. Chartered
Sys's Corp., 490 F. Supp. 343 (D. Minn. 1980); Navigator Group Funds v.
Shearson Hayden Stone, Inc., 487 F. Supp. 416 (S.D.N.Y. 1980); Alken v. Lerner, 485 F. Supp. 871 (D.N.J. 1980); Jones v. B.C. Christopher & Co., 466 F.
Supp. 213 (D. Kan. 1979).
202. 468 F. Supp. 105, 111 (N.D. IM.1979) (quoting remarks of Senator Talmadge, 120 CONG. REC. 30,459 (1974)) (emphasis added by court).
203. Statement of the CFTC Concerning Referral of Private Litigation
Under the Doctrine of Primary Jurisdiction, 41 Fed. Reg. 18471 (1976).
204. Smith v. Groover, 468 F. Supp. 105 (N.D. Ill.
1979); Curran v. Merrill
Lynch, Pierce, Fenner &Smith, Inc., 622 F.2d 216 (6th Cir. 1980). See also
Navigator Group Funds v. Shearson Hayden Stone, Inc., 487 F. Supp. 416
(S.D.N.Y. 1980).
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amination of legislative history. Senator Dole considered the
purpose of the 1974 amendments to be "to protect any individual
who desires to participate in the futures market trading. '20 5 The
second factor, whether there is any explicit or implicit indication
of legislative intent to grant or deny a private right of action, was
also found in the legislative history of the 1974 amendments,
which indicated that Congress was aware of the fact that courts
had been implying the existence of a private remedy under the
CEA. Chairman Poage stated that "courts [had] implied a private remedy for individual litigants in the Commodity Exchange
Act. ' 20 6 Senator Huddleston, sponsor of a later 1978 bill dealing
with the reparations remedy, commented:
Thus an aggrieved commodity customer will be able to obtain more
expeditious treatment of his claim should the customer elect to
pursue a claim in reparations rather than proceed to arbitration or
pursue in court the private right of action which has been judicially
implied for violations of certain provisions of the Commodity Exchange Act, or which 2in
the future courts may recognize for other
07
provisions of the Act.
The Smith and Curran courts found that the third element,
whether the implication of a private right of action would be
consistent with the underlying purposes of the Act, was satisfied
because the CFTC "consistently interpreted the reparations section as permitting commodity customers an election of forums
in which to pursue their claims. '20 8 The fourth factor, whether
an implied private action would infringe on an area of state concern, was met because regulation of commodities was found to
be a federal matter.20 9 The Smith and Curran courts therefore
held that an implied private right of action under the CEA survived the 1974 amendments and that the enactment of the reparations proceedings section was intended only as a
210
supplemental remedy.
In Leist v. Simplot,21 l the district court found that the plaintiffs met the requirements of the first prong of the test. The
court quoted Senator Dole, who recognized that the primary
205. 622 F.2d 216, 233 (6th Cir. 1980). See 120 CONG. REC. 30,467 (Sept. 8,
1974).
206. 622 F.2d at 234 n.27, citing Hearings on H.R. 11955 Before the House
Comm. on Agriculture, 93d Cong., 2d Sess. 249, 321 (1973) (remarks of Rep.
Poage).
207. Smith v. Groover, 468 F. Supp. 105, 114 (N.D. Ill.
1979) (citing 124
CONG. REC. S10,537 (July 12, 1978)).

208. Smith v. Groover, 468 F. Supp. 105, 115 (N.D. Ill.
1979). See 41 Fed.
Reg. 3994 (1976).
209. 468 F. Supp. at 115.
210. Id. See also Curran v. Merrill Lynch, Pierce, Fenner &Smith, Inc.,
622 F.2d 216 (6th Cir. 1980).

211. 470 F. Supp. 1256 (S.D.N.Y. 1979).
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purposes of the 1974 amendments were "[to protect] against manipulation of markets and to protect any individual who desires
to participate in futures market trading. ' 212 The second prong of
Cort proved troublesome. Looking to the 1974 amendments, the
establishment of administrative reparation proceedings, and the
vesting of disciplinary and regulatory power in the CFTC, the
court could not find any legislative intent to imply a private right
of action. 213 Congressional awareness of the need, and its fail214
ure to expressly provide for it, reinforced the court's decision.
The court determined that the third prong of Cort is met only
when the implication of the private right of action is necessary
to further the purposes of the statute at issue. The FCMs were
subject to reparation proceedings and therefore no need for judicially implied remedies existed. 21- Finally, the court determined that the fourth prong was met because the regulation of
commodity futures trading was a federal rather than a state concern. 216 Therefore, because all parts of the Cort test had not
been satisfied, the defendants' motion for summary judgment
was granted.
The Second Circuit reversed,2 17 again using the Cort test. It
held that the first prong was satisfied based on the Senate Re212. Id. at 1260 (citing 120 CONG.
213. The district court stated:

REC.

30,466 (-, 1974)).

We believe that under the maxim of "expressio unius est exclusio alter-

ius," the establishment of administrative reparation proceedings and
the plenary grant of disciplinary and regulatory power to the CFTC evidences a congressional intent to deny a private right of action under the
Act. This conclusion is reinforced by the fact that Congress was informed of the need for a private right of action under the Act but rejected a bill which would have expressly established such a right of
action.
470 F. Supp. at 1260.
214. Id.
215. Id. Since there are limitations on the amount of civil penalties
which may be assessed against a contract market (an overall limitation of
$100,000) and since the CFTC is required to consider whether the amount of
the penalty would "materially impair" the market's ability to carry on its
operations, the district court concluded that the implication of further penalties was unnecessary.
216. Id. See Smith v. Groover, 468 F. Supp. 105 (N.D. Ill 1979); Gravois v.
Fairchild, Arabatzis &Smith, 2 COMM. Fur. L. REP. (CCH) 20,706 (E.D. La.
Nov. 9, 1978).
217. 638 F.2d 283 (2d Cir. 1980). See Pollock v. Citrus Assoc., 2 COMM. FuT.
L. REP. (CCH) 21,165 (S.D.N.Y. Apr. 1, 1981) which followed Leist. In Pollock, the defendants included a broker-dealer and sales representative who
allegedly manipulated orange juice future contract prices upward. The
plaintiffs had sold November contracts and did not liquidate them prior to
November 16, 1977. The plaintiffs also alleged that the exchange failed both
to perform its regulatory duties and to prevent the alleged manipulation.
The court found that a private right of action existed against the brokerdealer and sales representative under § 96 of the CEA and also against the
exchange under §§ 5(d) and 5a(8) of the CEA.

19831

Private Rights of Action

port on the 1922 Act, which indicated that the Act's purpose was
to protect investers. 21 8 The majority also cited the House Report
on the 1978 amendments, which states that "the community protected under federal commodity laws was expanded to include
speculators. ' 219 This persuaded the court that the plaintiffs
were within the protected class. In addition, the court noted
that Congress explicitly recognized that most futures trading
was transacted by speculators. 220 Turning to the statements of
Chairman Poage of the Committee on Agriculture, that speculators "provide a very real service to the market and its users by
providing liquidity,"22 1 the majority firmly concluded that the
plaintiffs met the requirements of the first prong of the Cort
222

test.

The second Cort prong, relating to congressional intent,
proved more difficult. The legislative history of the Act indicated that the 1974 amendments "signaled a dramatic shift from
the theory of exchange self-regulation to authorization of the
CFTC to compel the exchanges to alter or adopt rules. ' 2 2 3 The
majority commented, "[N]o amount of labored parsing can obscure the self-evident truth that Congress knew the courts were
'224
implying private rights of action and did nothing to alter this.
House and Senate hearings were found to be "replete" with references to the maintenance of private causes of action under the
Act. 2 2 5 Therefore, the majority invoked the canon of construction which provides that the reenactment of a statute incorporates prior judicial interpretations, 226 and found that this
supported an implied private right of action.
The reparations procedure was found not to be the sole remedy for an injured party for several reasons. This method is of

218. 638 F.2d at 304 (quoting S. REP. No. 871, 67th Cong., 2d Sess. 3
(1922)).

219. 638 F.2d at 283

(quoting H.R. REP. No. 1181, 95th Cong., 2d Sess. 84

(1978)).

220. 638 F.2d at 305 (citing H.R. REP. No. 743, 90th Cong., 1st Sess. 2 (1967);
S. REP. No. 947, 90th Cong., 2d Sess., reprinted in 1968 2 U.S. CODE CONG. &
AD. NEWS 1675).

221. 638 F.2d at 306 (quoting 119 CONG. REC. 41,332 (Dec. 13, 1973) and 120
CONG. REC. 10,739 (April 11, 1974) where Rep. Wampler stated that the
"speculator performs an important economic function in futures markets.")
222. 638 F.2d at 306.
223. Id. at 309.
224. Id.
225. Id. See also Hearing on Review of Commodity Exchange Act and
Discussion of Possible Changes Before the House Comm. on Agriculture, 93d
Cong., 1st Sess. 121 (1973); Hearingson H.R. 11955 Before the House Comm.
on Agriculture, 93d Cong., 2d Sess. 249 (1974); Hearingson S. 2485, S. 2578, S.
2837, and H.R. 13113 Before the Senate Comm. on Agriculture and Forestry,
93d Cong., 2d Sess. 294 (1974).
226. See Van Vankren v. Helvering, 115 F.2d 709, 710 (2d Cir. 1940).
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limited scope since it is available only against those individuals
who are or should be registered. Legislative history described
the reparations procedure as a "new" remedy, 227 thus implying
that the "old" remedies, i.e., implied private judicial actions,
continued to exist. The amendments did not provide an express
preemption of a court's jurisdiction to hear such cases. Lastly,
the "savings clause" inserted into the amendments specifically
stated that the legislation did not "supersede or limit the jurisdiction conferred" on the courts. 228 The majority brushed aside
the argument that Congress could have expressly enacted legislation to grant private remedies by stating that "objection to the
particular terms and inertia in the way of correction... ,or just
plain loss in the legislative shuffle" 229 could explain the void.
These factors led the majority to conclude that only express legislation could have destroyed the judicially created private
remedy.
The third Cort prong was also found to be satisfied, based
largely on the court's analysis of the second prong. 230 With regard to the fourth prong, the majority found that the federal statutes had preempted state laws.231 Therefore, an implied private

remedy was allowed in Leist.
Several courts have presumed the existence of a private
right of action under the CEA without resorting to a Cort analysis. Based upon the pre-1974 case of Deaktor, the Seventh Circuit found without discussion that such an action existed.232 In
E.F. Hutton & Co. v. Lewis,233 the district court found it had jurisdiction because of a federal statute giving district courts original jurisdiction in any matter concerning the regulation of
commerce or protecting trade against restraints or monopolies. 234 The court also concluded that implied private remedies

under the Act were appropriate because other courts had implied them.

235

In Ames v. Merrill Lynch, Pierce,Fenner& Smith, Inc .,236 the
court summarily found that an implied private right of action
existed.237 The Ames court refused either to compel the plaintiff
227.
228.
229.
230.
231.
232.
233.
234.

Leist v. Simplot, 638 F.2d 283, 313 (2d Cir. 1980).
See 7 U.S.C. § 2 (1976).
638 F.2d at 318.
Id.at 321.
Id.at 322.
Case &Co., Inc. v. Board of Trade, 523 F.2d 355 (7th Cir. 1975).
410 F. Supp. 416 (E.D. Mich. 1976).
See 28 U.S.C. § 1337 (1976).

235. 410 F. Supp. at 419.
236. 567 F.2d 1174 (2d Cir. 1977).
237. Id.at 1176.
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to pursue agreed arbitration remedies or to stay the federal
court action. 238 R.J. Hereley & Son Co. v. Stotler & Co.239 followed Ames and reached the same result. The Hereley court
also found that the express remedies provided in the CEA were
not exclusive. 24° In Merrill Lynch, Pierce,Fenner & Smith, Inc. v.
Goldman 241 and Hirk v. Agri-Research Council, Inc.242 the Seventh and Eighth Circuits summarily stated in dictum that implied private right remedies existed under the CEA.24 3 None of
these courts relied on Cort, yet they still found implied private
244
rights of action.
Some courts required that a plaintiff exhaust administrative
remedies before they would hear the private action issue. In
Consolo v. Hornblower & Weeks-Hemphill, Noyes, Inc.,245 the
court found that under the CEA, it was constrained from exercising jurisdiction until the statutorily granted remedies were
exhausted. Furthermore, the court looked to a 1974 amendment
to the CEA which stated that the CFTC was specifically empowered to bring legal action for CEA violations in the proper court
to either enjoin the action or force compliance; in lieu of bringing such action itself, the CFTC could request that the Attorney
General do So.246 The court therefore held that no other party
was authorized to bring suit.
In Bartels v. International Commodities Corp .,247 a district
court found that Congress' enactment of a reparations procedure required a plaintiff to first exhaust his administrative reme248
dies before bringing an action to invoke private remedies.
The court found that the passing of the CFTCA took commodity
futures options away from the coverage of the federal securities
238.
239.
240.
241.

Id.
466
Id.
593

at 1181.
F. Supp. 345 (N.D. Ill. 1979).
at 347.
F.2d 129 (8th Cir.), cert. denied, 444 U.S. 838 (1979).

242. 561 F.2d 96 (7th Cir. 1977).

243. 593 F.2d at 133 n.7; 561 F.2d at 103 n.8.
244. Other decisions which failed to use the Cort analysis include Witzel
v. Chartered Sys's Corp., 490 F. Supp. 343 (D. Minn. 1980) and Grayson v.
ContiCommodity Serv's Inc., 2 Comm. Fur. L. REP. (CCH) $ 21,033 (D.D.C.
May 23, 1980). In Witzel, the court perfunctorily cited the Cort factors but
did not use them in finding the existence of a private remedy. The Grayson
court, without analysis, simply relied on earlier authority to imply a private

right of action. See also Case &Co., Inc. v. Board of Trade, 523 F.2d 355 (7th
Cir. 1975); Kelley v. Carr, 442 F. Supp. 346 (W.D. Mich. 1977); E.F. Hutton &
Co. v. Lewis, 410 F. Supp. 416 (E.D. Mich. 1976).
245. 436 F. Supp. 447 (N.D. Ohio 1976).
246. Id. at 454, citing 7 U.S.C. § 13a-1 (1974).
247. 435 F. Supp. 865 (D. Conn. 1977).

248. Id. at 868.

The John Marshall Law Review

[Vol. 16:307

laws, including the private right of action previously implied.249
The court stated that a defrauded commodity invester would no
longer be able to bring an action under SEC rule 10b-5 because
the CEA reparations procedure "clearly displaced" the previous
action.250 A defrauded plaintiff must first invoke the reparations
procedure, or any other remedy granted in the CEA, before initiating a private right of action under the CEA antifraud
25
provisions. '
Those courts completely denying an implied private right of
action did so under a Cort analysis. 25 2 The courts were divided
on whether the plaintiff in each case was a member of the class
for whose especial benefit the statute was enacted. In Berman v.
Bache, Halsey, Stuart, Shields, Inc.,253 the court found that

plaintiff was a member of the class protected by the antifraud
provision of the CEA. 254 In Liang v. Hunt,255 however, plaintiff

was not a member of the class protected by the anti-price manipulation or excessive speculation provisions of the CEA. In
Fischer v. Rosenthal and Company,2 56 the court was willing to

concede "arguendo" that plaintiff was a member of the class protected by the CEA antifraud provision. 257 There was no split
over deciding whether there was any explicit or implicit indication of legislative intent to grant or deny a private remedy. In
Berman, the CFrC was viewed as the "single expert agency"
249. Id. The jurisdiction of cases involving various aspects of commodity
futures is undecided. The respective chairmen of the SEC and CFTC entered into an "accord," resulting in a division of jurisdiction over this area.
See SEC and CFTC Jurisdiction Agreement, Proposed Legislation, 2 Comm.
FuT. L. REP. (CCH) 83,096 (Feb. 2, 1982). The Seventh Circuit, in Chicago
Board of Trade v. SEC, - F.2d -, 2 Comm. Fur. L. REP. (CCH) 21,365 (7th
Cir. Mar. 24, 1982), ruled that options on GNMA are commodities. This decision materially affects the "accord." This entire area must now await congressional action. See S. 2260 and S. REP. No. 390, 97th Cong., 2d Sess. 1, 3
(1982).
250. 435 F. Supp. 865, 869. See also Consolo v. Hornblower & WeeksHemphill, Noyes, Inc., 436 F. Supp. 447 (N.D. Ohio 1976) (no private right
exists to stay an arbitration proceeding and compel litigation in district
court).
251. 435 F. Supp. at 870.
252. See Stone v. Saxon &Windsor Group Ltd., 485 F. Supp. 1212 (N.D. Ill.
1980); Walsh v. International Precious Metals Corp., 2 Comm. Fur. L. REP.
(CCH) $ 21,186 (D. Utah Mar. 25, 1981); Hensley v. Maduff & Sons, 2 CoMM.
FuT. LAW REP. (CCH) 21,017 (D.C. Cal. Apr. 1, 1980); Fischer v. Rosenthal &
Co., 481 F. Supp. 53 (N.D. Tex. 1979); Liang v. Hunt, 477 F. Supp. 891 (N.D. Ill.
1979); Berman v. Bache, Halsey, Stuart, Shields, Inc., 467 F. Supp. 311 (S.D.
Ohio 1979).
253. 467 F. Supp. 311 (S.D. Ohio 1979). See Hensley v. Maduff & Sons, 2

Comm. Fur. L. REP. (CCH)
254.
255.'
256.
257.

21,017 (D.C. Cal. Apr. 1, 1980).

467 F. Supp. at 322.
477 F. Supp. 891 (N.D. Ill. 1979).
481 F. Supp. 53 (N.D. Tex. 1979).
Id. at 56.
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empowered by Congress with the responsibility for regulating
commodity futures trading. 258 However, the courts were at odds
on whether an implied private remedy was consistent with the
purpose of the statute. The Berman court found that a private
action would deprive the CFTC of its opportunity to build a
strong federal regulatory policy. 259 Conversely, the Liang court
determined that such a remedy would have only an incidental
effect on enforcing provisions of the CEA. 260 As to the fourth
prong, the regulation of commodity futures trading was found in
Liang to be a federal matter. 261 However, the Berman court determined this to be subject to state regulation, with federal regu262
lation as an alternative.
Additioral arguments in opposition to an implied private
263
remedy are found in the Second Circuit's dissent in Leist.
There Judge Mansfield focused on the absence of congressional
intent to create a private remedy in the plaintiffs' favor, stating
that the CEA, "when analyzed according to well-settled principles of construction established by the Supreme Court in Cort v.
Ash,. . . fails completely to reveal any [c] ongressional intent to
approve, much less create, an implied private right of action in
favor of these plaintiffs ....,,264 The majority's use of a "nowoutmoded" tort theory and congressional silence to support implying a private remedy was also criticized. Congress was not
under any obligation either to state that the remedies created by
statute were exclusive or to expressly disavow itself from previous judicial decisions implying a private remedy. Reliance on a
presumption that Congress was aware of previous judicial decisions and approved of them "is to substitute sheer speculation
'26 5
for hard evidence of intent.
According to Judge Mansfield, the plaintiffs must bear the
burden of proving that "Congress had an unexpressed intent in
258. 467 F. Supp. at 322. See also Liang v. Hunt, 477 F. Supp. 891, 893 (N.D.
Ill.
1979).

259.
260.
261.
262.

467 F. Supp. at 323.
477 F. Supp. at 894.
Id.
467 F. Supp. at 323.

263. 638 F.2d 283, 323-56 (2d Cir. 1980) (Mansfield, J., dissenting).

264. Id. at 323.
265. Id. at 324. Judge Mansfield also stated that none of the pre-1974 decisions upon which the majority relied were ever cited or discussed by Congress. The only pre-1974 case that implied a private remedy was Deaktor v.
L.D. Schreiber & Co., 479 F.2d 529 (7th Cir.), rev'd on other grounds sub nom.

Chicago Mercantile Exch. v. Deaktor, 414 U.S. 113 (1973), but Congress has
never cited it for this proposition.
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favor of such a remedy. ' 266 He argued that the majority incorrectly presumed that a private right could be implied in the absence of any congressional comment to the contrary. Any
creation of an implied remedy, absent clear congressional intent, usurped the legislative branch's powers and ran afoul of
the doctrine of separation of powers. Congress' silence and supposed knowledge of judicial decisions implying a private right of
action under commodities laws since 1967 could not be taken as
an expressed intent to continue the implication of such a remedy. The dissent concluded that the plaintiffs had failed to sustain their burden of proof to adduce evidence of such
intent
267
either on the face of the Act or by legislative history.
The statute's expressly stated remedies and means of enforcement precluded a judicially created remedy, the dissent argued. 268 Any investigation of Congress' intent by means of
examining the legislative history could "run the danger of attributing to Congress thoughts it never actually had. '269 Therefore,
if such were attempted, the dissent argued, "primary weight
should be placed on the language of the statute and on clear,
unequivocal statements by those responsible for its enactment. ' 270 Judge Mansfield contended that the antifraud statute
relied upon by the plaintiffs was enacted to protect brokerdealer customers, not the plaintiffs here, and was not necessary
since the administrative remedies (reparations) were available
to the plaintiffs. In fact, a private action would be duplicative
because the administrative remedies were available.271
The dissent also argued that neither the language nor structure of the CEA indicated any express or implied intent to benefit a special class of individuals. The Act was designed to protect
the public, primary producers, and customers from huge price
fluctuations in the commodities markets. 27 2 The debates on the
1974 amendments also included protecting hedgers, but not
speculators such as the plaintiffs here. 273 The 1978 amendments
266. 638 F.2d at 324. See Securities Investor Protection Corp. v. Barbour,
421 U.S. 412, 419 (1975); National R.R. Passenger Corp. v. National Ass'n of
R.R. Passengers, 414 U.S. 453, 458 (1974).
267. 638 F.2d at 324.

268. Judge Mansfield stated that "the broader the scope and type of the
expressly-provided remedies, the less is the need or justification for implying an unmentioned additional private remedy." Id. at 327.
269. Id. The dissent also stated that "[E]xtrapolations based on gossamer-thin fabric, requiring speculative assumptions as to Congress' intent
are to be avoided." Id.
270.
271.
272.
273.

Id.
Id. at 329-31.
Id. at 334.
Id. at 334-35.
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also failed to include speculators as those protected under the
Act, despite the fact that some lower courts were denying an im274
plied private remedy.
The second and third prongs of the Cort test were the focus
of the Fifth Circuit in Rivers v. Rosenthal and Co.275 The court
found that the CFTCA was not a reenactment of previous statutes, differing from the Leist premise, and denied the presumption of incorporation of "judicial baggage" that arose from those
statutes. Therefore, because the 1974 amendments were a "complete overhaul," plaintiff was required to provide "'clear contrary evidence of legislative intent' affirmatively to provide such
an implied right in addition to the express remedies. '276 The
Fifth Circuit commented that even if the plaintiff's references to
Congress' awareness of prior judicial recognition of implied private remedies was assumed, no indication of congressional approval of these decisions was cited. The court believed that both
factors must exist in order to find legislative intent, and here it
found neither. The failure of the plaintiff to convince the court
that statements made by House or Senate members sufficiently
supported a private remedy, combined with congressional failure to approve any of three bills expressly providing for a private remedy, helped the court to conclude that no legislative
intent to allow such a remedy existed. 277 The court also rejected
the plaintiffs contention that legislative intent could be inferred
from the "context or zeitgeist in which the legislation was enacted. '278 With respect to whether implication of a private remedy would be consistent with legislative intent, the court
concluded that Congress perceived that any action claiming an
implied private remedy would be a "threat to the goal of devel279
oping a coherent and consistent body of law."
These differing decisions rendered by federal district and
appellate courts merely multiplied confusion. Practitioners had
hoped that from this hodge-podge of conflicting case law the
Supreme Court would settle the issue once and for all. Curran
was to have been the decisive case.
274. Id. at 353.
275. 634 F.2d 774 (5th Cir. 1980), vacated, - U.S. -, 102 S. Ct. 2228, on
remand, 686 F.2d 297 (5th Cir. 1982). The defendant conceded to the first

and fourth prongs. Id. at 782 n.13. See also Walsh v. International Precious
Metals Corp., 510 F. Supp. 867 (D. Utah 1981) (the court specifically followed
Rivers).
276. 634 F.2d at 784 (quoting National R.R. Passenger Corp. v. National
Ass'n of R.R. Passengers, 414 U.S. 453 (1974)).
277. 634 F.2d at 788.
278. Id. at 789.
279. Id. at 791.
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THE SUPREME COURT DECISION

Justice Stevens, formerly of the Seventh Circuit Court of
Appeals which sits in Chicago, Illinois, the home of the world's
two largest commodity futures exchanges, wrote the majority
opinion in Curran. Interestingly, little effort was expended in
applying Cort. Rather, Cort was acknowledged, the "intent of
Congress" was pronounced paramount, and Justice Stevens
stated that "[tihe key to this case is our understanding of the
intent of Congress in 1974 when it comprehensively reexamined
'280
and strengthened the federal regulation of futures trading.
To better understand the basis for the decision, it will be helpful
to present first the principal arguments the Court rejected.
The Supreme Court was faced with a bevy of arguments
against an implied private action. At the outset, one must concede that the plaintiffs in Curran and Leist were ". . .of the
class for whose especial benefit the statute was enacted," and
that commodity futures regulation is a federal rather than a
state concern. Thus the first and fourth prongs of Cort were satisfied. However, the main arguments against a private right of
action and their bases are rather straightforward. The fundamental principle, in line with Cort, is that under the system of
separation of powers a cause of action should be created by
Congress. 281 If Congress had wanted a private damage action to
exist, it could easily have provided one. 2 2 Moreover, while Cort
had not been decided at the time of the 1974 amendments to the
CEA, the judiciary had on numerous occasions indicated its reluctance to imply private rights of action. 283 Congress, it must
be assumed, knew of those pronouncements when it enacted the
284
amendments.
It has been argued that since a private right of action had
been implied as early as 1967 in Goodman v. H. Hentz and Co.,285
the 1974 amendments implicitly carry the judicial baggage attached to the statute. This view is sound when subsequent legislation supplements a statute. Where, as here, however, the
1974 amendments completely overhauled the CEA, existing judicial baggage must be jettisoned with the outmoded legislation.
To characterize the 1974 amendments as anything less than a
280. Merrill Lynch, Pierce, Fenner &Smith, Inc., v. Curran, 456 U.S. 353,
102 S. Ct. 1825 (1982).
281. Cannon v. University of Chicago, 441 U.S. 677, 742 (1979); Rivers v.
Rosenthal & Co., 634 F.2d 774, 781 n.11, 789 (5th Cir. 1980).
282. Touche Ross & Co. v. Redington, 442 U.S. 560, 571 (1979).

283. See supra notes 176-77 and accompanying text.
284. See supra notes 176-77 and accompanying text.
1967).
285. 265 F. Supp. 440 (N.D. Ill.
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substantial revision of the CEA is folly. After all, a new regulatory agency was created, the CFTC, which was vested with exclusive jurisdiction over commodity futures. Reparations, a new
forum for the resolution of disputes, was created along with a
host of other new provisions. 286 Thus, prior judicial decisions, at
least on the question of private rights of action, should not have
287
been perpetuated.
Another compelling factor available for the Court's consideration was Congress' unwillingness to enact H.R. 11195,288 S.
2837,289 and S. 2578,290 each of which contained language providing for an express private right of action and treble damages for
violations of the CEA. It has been argued that unsuccessful attempts to enact legislation are not the best guide to legislative
intent.29 ' Nevertheless, when unenacted legislation is coupled
with everything else attendant to the 1974 amendments, the failure to enact those bills specifically providing for private rights of
action must carry greater weight. Nothing can be a greater expression of congressional intent with respect to private damage
actions than an outright rejection of three bills which would
292
have created such a right.
The foregoing, viewed in conjunction with the novel creation
of a reparations procedure designed expressly for the commodity futures industry, evidences the congressional intent that reparations, along with contract market arbitrations, must have
been precisely what Congress intended as the sole and exclusive forum for the resolution of commodity futures trading disputes. In this connection, it must be noted that the reparations
procedure was first proposed in H.R. 11955.293 This bill appeared
almost immediately after the failure of H.R. 11195 which provided an express private right of action. 294 Further, it can be inferred from those proposals that Congress intended the body of
decisional law in this area, except for cases under the $15,000
arbitration jurisdictional limits, to be developed exclusively in
286. See generally H.R. REP. No. 975, 93d Cong. 2d Sess. 48 (1974); Rivers
v. Rosenthal & Co., 634 F.2d 774, 784 (5th Cir. 1980).

287.
288.
289.
290.
291.
292.
293.
13113,

634 F.2d at 784.
93d Cong., 1st Sess. § 17(3) (1973).
93d Cong., 1st Sess. § 505 (1973).
93d Cong., 1st Sess. § 203(3) (1973).
Red Lion Broadcasting v. FCC, 395 U.S. 367 (1969).
Rivers v. Rosenthal & Co., 634 F.2d 774, 788-89 (5th Cir. 1980).
The version of legislation that later passed in the House was H.R.
93d Cong., 2d Sess., reprinted in 1974 U.S. CODE CONG. & AD. NEWS

5843.
294. S. REP. No. 250, 93d Cong., 2d Sess. 48, reprinted in 1978 U.S. CODE
CONG. & AD. NEWS, 2087, 2114.
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the CFTC's forum. 295 While Cort does provide four considerations, "legislative intent" is the linchpin.296 The foregoing
should make clear that whatever arguments one advances, strict
adherence to Cort would not have provided sufficient support to
imply a private right of action under the CEA.
The majority's decision in Curran to imply a private right of
action under the CEA was based on several arguments. First,
Congress intended to allow private rights of action when the
1974 amendments were enacted. 297 Second, Congress was presumed to be aware of the judicial implication of private remedies when it enacted the 1974 amendments. 298 In addition, the
court found that the 1974 amendments were intended to supplement, not supplant, the existing legislation under which a private right of action had been implied. 2 99 Fourth, the enactment
of the "savings clause" 300 was intended to preserve implied private remedies. 30 ' Finally, since congressional intent for implying a private right of action existed, the respondents (plaintiffs
in the original actions) had standing to sue both the exchanges
30 2
and the participants in the conspiracy under the CEA.
Examining the "congressional perception" of the 1974
amendments, the majority focused upon whether Congress intended to preserve the pre-existing judicial implication of private remedies. Citing Cannon, the Curran Court stated that
Congress was presumed to know the law; that is, that federal
30 3
courts were implying a private right of action under the CEA.
The "pre-1975 routine recognition" of such a remedy constituted
the "contemporary legal context" under which the 1974 amendments were enacted. The majority therefore concluded that
Congress' thorough re-examination of the CEA, followed by its
failure to amend the statutes under which implied private remedies had been granted, meant that Congress intended to pre3°4
serve such a remedy.
295. Rivers v. Rosenthal & Co., 634 F.2d 774, 782 (5th Cir. 1980).
296. Merrill Lynch, Pierce, Fenner &Smith, Inc. v. Curran, 456 U.S. 353,-,
102 S. Ct. 1825, 1839 (1982).
297. Id.
298. Id. at-, 102 S. Ct. at 1841.
299. Id. at -,102 S. Ct. at 1842.
300. 7 U.S.C. § 1 (1976 &Supp. 1I 1978).
301. 456 U.S. at -, 102 S. Ct. at 1843.
302. Id. at -,102 S. Ct. at 1847.
303. Id. at -, 102 S. Ct. at 1839-49. The majority also made an analogy to
cases under SEC rule 10b-5 and congressional awareness of the courts' actions. Id.
304. Id. at -, 102 S. Ct. at 1841. Although the majority stated that legislative history supports this conclusion, it failed to cite specific examples.
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The Court found that the new procedures for seeking redress of CEA violations established by the 1974 amendments
"were intended to supplement rather than supplant the implied
judicial remedy. '30 5 The creation of the CF'rC, whose functions
among other things were to supplement the exchanges' rules, to
ensure the exchanges' enforcement of their rules, and to establish administrative procedures, was seen by the majority as
proof of Congress' desire to preserve the implied private remedy
as another method to assure compliance with the CEA. 30 6 In so
doing, the Court cited Senator Talmadge's statement that the
were "not intended
newly established administrative remedies
3 0°7
to interfere with the courts in any way.
The enactment of the "savings clause" was found to be "direct evidence of legislative intent" that implied private remedies
be preserved. 30 8 Since the purpose of the savings clause was to
continue the courts' jurisdiction over commodity futures trading
violations, Congress must have had the preservation of judicially-implied private remedies in mind. Congress' immediate
action to dispel any notion that the clause was intended only to
consolidate the CFTC's rulemaking power by separating its jurisdiction from the SEC was found to serve as additional proof.
The statutory language of the antifraud provision of the
CEA was found to include the respondents (plaintiffs in the
original actions), thus giving them standing to sue since the majority found congressional intent for implying a private right of
action. 30 9 The Court focused upon other actions against the ex305. Id. at -, 102 S. Ct. 1842. The majority found that the new procedures
created by Congress in the 1974 amendments (reparations and arbitration)

were not intended as a substitute for the implication of a private remedy.
The majority pointed to the fact that a reparations proceeding is not available against the exchanges. The arbitration proceeding is narrower in
scope and is available only against members and employees of the contract
market.
306. Id.
307. Id. at -, 102 S. Ct. at 1843 (quoting statement of Sen. Talmadge in
120 CONG. REC. 30,459 (1974)). Senator Talmadge was Chairman of the Senate Committee on Agriculture and Forestry.
308. Id. The Court noted that Talmadge and Poage reported that

the conferees wished to make clear that nothing in the act would supersede or limit the jurisdiction presently conferred on courts of the

United States or any State. This act is remedial legislation designed to
correct certain abuses which Congress found to exist in areas that will
now come within the jurisdiction of the CFTC.
120 CONG. REC. 34,737, 34,997 (1974).

309. 456 U.S. at -, 102 S. Ct. at 1844. The majority stated that
the characterization of persons who invest in futures contracts as
"speculators" does not exclude them from the class of persons protected by the CEA. The statutory scheme could not effectively protect
the producers and processors who engage in hedging transactions without also protecting the other participants in the market whose transac-
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changes which were allowed to be brought, and surmised that
Congress intended private action brought against the exchanges
to be another means of enforcement of the CEA's self-regulation
3 10
concept.
Congress' consistent strengthening of the "regulation
scheme" without specifically voiding the judicial tradition of implying private remedies was the final support for the holding.
Without comment the Court also concluded that "participants in
a conspiracy to manipulate the market in violation of311those rules
are also subject to suit" by the traders they injure.
The dissent, written by Justice Powell, stated that the majority erred in both its reliance on pre-1974 district court decisions implying a private remedy and in its conclusion that
Congress impliedly endorsed those decisions by failing to
amend the CEA in 1974. The dissent also opposed the finding
that Congress in 1974 intended to retain judicially implied private remedies under the CEA. Justice Powell pointedly commented that the majority reached the latter conclusion "without
even token deference to established tests for discerning con'3 12
gressional intent.
The majority, the dissent argued, based its implication of a
private right of action on congressional inaction and erroneous
decisions by the lower federal courts. 313 The basis for such "erroneous" lower federal court decisions was Goodman.3 14 The
majority concluded that Congress was aware of Goodman and
the other decisions in 1974 when it did not expressly eliminate
this judicial remedy. The dissent attacked this reasoning, commenting that the majority did not produce any "evidence of the
kinds generally recognized as most probative of congressional
315
intent.,
tions over exchanges necessarily must conform to the same trading
rules.
Id.
310. Id. at -, 102 S. Ct. at 1847.
311. Id. The majority found that as with "the analogous Rule 10b-5," privity of dealing is not necessary in order to maintain an action. As with rule
lOb-5, the courts must "fill in the interstices" of the implied cause of action
under the CEA. Id.
312. Id. at -, 102 S. Ct. at 1848 (Powell, J., dissenting). Joining in the
dissent were Chief Justice Burger and Justices Rehnquist and O'Connor.
313. Id.
314. See Goodman v. H. Hentz & Co., 265 F. Supp. 440 (N.D. Ill. 1967).
315. 456 U.S. at -, 102 S. Ct. at 1852. In fact, the dissent found "persuasive evidence on the face of the statute that Congress did not contemplate a
judicial remedy for damages against exchanges." Id. The 1974 amendments expressly subject the exchanges to fines and sanctions for noncompliance with their own rules. See 7 U.S.C. § 13a (1976). Any implication of

19831

Private Rights of Action

The dissent also criticized several other foundations of the
majority's argument. Authorizing the CFTC to create additional
regulations for exchanges does not expressly contemplate an
implied judicial remedy. 316 Nor does the addition of an administrative reparations procedure. In fact, reparations denies a private right of action. Moreover, the majority did not answer the
question of why an administrative remedy would be created
while implications of judicial actions continue. 317 Last, the savings clause does not of itself bestow a substantive right to sue
3 18
for damages.
The dissent also supplied a chart which it claimed evi3 19
denced Congress' intent in enacting the 1974 amendments.
The chart displayed the features of each proposed bill. The dissent argued that since none of the proposed bills listed any "implied damages actions," the majority could at most argue that in
1974 Congress did not disapprove of Goodman.3 20 Justice Powell's final argument was that the judicial creation of implied remedies could disrupt the functions of federal regulatory agencies
and could create a burden for Congress by requiring constant
awareness of the decisions of lower federal courts. 32 1 The dissent concluded that there was no evidence of congressional intent to recognize the implication of a private remedy.
CONCLUSIONS AND RECOMMENDATIONS

The Curran decision does not advance Cort although Cort

should be the controlling case in this area. Had Cort been meticulously applied in Curran, no private right of action would
have been implied under the CEA. Such a conclusion is clearly
private remedies could expose the exchanges to greater fines than that contemplated by Congress when it enacted the legislation.
316. 456 U.S. at -, 102 S. Ct. at 1852-53.
317. Id. The dissent concluded that the majority ignored the judicial canon of statutory construction which states that where a statute expressly
provides a remedy, a court must be wary of incorporating other remedies
into the statute.
318. Id. at -, 102 S. Ct. at 1854. The dissent found that the enactment of
the clause was not probative of whether or not a remedy should be implied.
The savings clause neither creates nor preserves any substantive right to
sue for damages.
319. Id. at -, 102 S. Ct. at 1855, Appendix A. See also Commodity Futures Commission Act: Hearingson S. 2485, S. 2578, S. 2837 and H.R. 13113

Before the Senate Comm. on Agriculture and Forestry, 93d Cong., 2d Sess.
194 (1974).
320. 456 U.S. at -, 102 S. Ct. at 1851-52.
321. Id. at -, 102 S. Ct. at 1855. The dissent concluded that such an act by
the majority will tax the legislature by making it respond to lower federal
court decisions. Otherwise, inaction, or silence, will be considered approval
of the courts' actions.
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consistent with recent decisions which deny private rights of action under various provisions of the federal securities laws.
Here, the Court's interpretation of Congress' understanding of
the law in 1974 is mere conjecture; other courts have reached
opposite conclusions regarding congressional intent with equal
facility. The slender reed of speculation does not justify subjecting a major national industry to multiple adversary forums.
As a result of Curran, the commodity futures industry has
become exposed to litigation in state courts, CFTC reparations
proceedings, exchange arbitration forums, and the federal
courts. Few industries are so exposed. That the risk shifting,
price discovery and hedging activities of the commodity futures
industry which is so important to the nation should become subject to law generated in four separate and distinct forums can
only result in confusion and hardship to the courts, to the public, and to the industry. Further, the sanctioning of tribunals
which derive their authority from different articles of the Constitution may well violate the separation of powers doctrine.
Congress can remedy the situation with a few pen strokes.
Unfortunately, it appears that Congress has opted to provide an
express private right of action in the Futures Trading Act of 1982
without limiting or eliminating the jurisdiction of other forums. 322 It would be preferable that new legislation should confine the resolution of commodity futures trading disputes to the
CFTC's reparations forum or exchange arbitrations since the
$15,000 jurisdictional ceiling amount for exchange arbitration
has been removed.323 Such a limitation will have several beneficial results. First, the industry's exposure will be reduced, not
as to liability, but as to choice of forum and inconsistency of rulings. Second, the development of a unified and consistent body
of case law, at least in the reparations area, will be promoted.
Third, the just resolution of disputes in this highly complex area
will be ensured because both the CFTC administrative judges
who hear reparations cases and the exchange members serving
on arbitration panels possess the expertise necessary to resolve
such disputes. Finally, removing these cases from federal (if not
322. See § 235 of the Futures Trading Act of 1982, Conference Report
to Accompanying H.R. 5447, 97th Cong., 2d Sess. 3 (1982). Compare Futures
Trading Act of 1982, H.R. 5447, 97th Cong., 2d Sess. § 236, Pub. L. 97-444,
- Stat. -, to be codified at 7 U.S.C. § 1- - (Jan. 11, 1983), which is intended

to amend the CEA by adding a new § 22, Private Rights of Action, with S.
2109, 97th Cong., 2d Sess. (1982) which does not contain a similar provision.
323. See § 217 of the Futures Trading Act of 1982, Conference Report to
Accompany H.R. 5447, 97th Cong., 2d Sess. 3 (1982); H. REP. No. 964, 97th
Cong., 2d Sess. 3 (1982) to amend section 22(a) (1) of the Act. The CFTC
issued a release encouraging the public to use exchange arbitration facilities. 46 F.R. 60834, 2 Comm. Fur. L. REP. (CCH) $ 21,286 (Dec. 14, 1981).
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347

state) courts will ameliorate some of the pressure on the already
324
overburdened judiciary.

324. See Burger, Annual Report on the State of Judiciary,66 A.B.A.J. 295
(1980).

